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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
On December 28, 1913, President Richard M. Nixon 
signed the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA) 
into law. It represented a major policy shift in federal 
efforts at solving the problems of unemployment and under-
employment. CETA was an historic Act which helped pave the 
way for new program forms. 
Before CETA, a variety of federal attempts had been 
made to prepare people for competition in the labor market 
or provide jobs in hard economic times. In 1917, Congress 
established the federal-state Vocational Education program 
(1, p. l). The public works projects of the New Deal com-
prised another attempt. In 1946, with the passage of the 
Employment Act, the United States government formally 
accepted responsibility for alleviating joblessness (2). 
By the 1960s, employment and training had become a regular 
item of concern at the national level, with annual expendi-
tures for such programs climbing into the multi-billion 
dollar range. The phrase •employment and training,• itself 
connotes the high position this area of policy now commands 
on the country's agenda. Over the past few decades, the 
scope of these programs has widened sufficiently to push 
2 
the old term, •manpower,• with its narrower connotation, out 
of common usage. 
CETA was enacted in response to the need, apparent by 
the late 1960s, for reforming the troubled employment and 
training delivery system. Many observers at the time felt 
that the system was becoming unmanageable. There seemed to 
be too much duplication of erf ort and a general lack of co-
ordination. Programs were being administered by thousands 
or contractors, both public and private, and federal rules 
governing the use of funds prevented implementors from act-
ing with flexibility under differing local conditions. 
Proposals for reform arose, calling for decentraliza-
tion of program control to state and local governments. A 
corollary concept of decentralization, which kept cropping 
up in these proposals, was decategorization (i.e., a broad-
ening of the discretion allowed to subnational implementors 
in spending federally-granted funds and a removal of fed-
eral •strings• attached thereto). The employment and 
training system had been funded largely by categorical 
grants-in-aid. Under a categorical grant arrangement, fed-
eral money is given to state and local governments on the 
condition that it be utilized in a relatively specific way, 
with procedures, program operators and eligible clients 
spelled out in the grant. It was such constraints on grant 
expenditures which frustrated many involved in implementa-
tion. 
J 
In addition to decentralization and decategorization, 
reformers felt that programs should be consolidated under 
the aegis of a single sporutoring authority in a given area 
(preferably an elected state or local official). The object 
of consolidation was to give clients a wide choice of oppor-
tunities while only having to deal with one government 
office. To the reformers, this would fit well with a reduc-
tion of the role of federal bureaucrats and make the system 
more efficient. Overall coordination and policy guidance 
could still be provided at the national level. 
In order to effect such changes, any new employment 
and training legislation would have to be comprehensive, 
that is, it would need to include provisions for virtually 
every type of program and clientele which could be realisti-
cally expected. State and local program sponsors would be 
required to handle the problems of the socially disadvan-
taged as well as those out of work temporarily because of 
downturns in the business cycle. Supportive services would 
be necessary1 for example, transportation of clients to job 
sites. Sponsors would have to possess the information, 
authority and funds appropriate for effective implementation. 
CETA embodied all of the above reform ideas and was 
thus historically important in two respects. First, it was 
one of the earliest efforts at transferring program control 
from federal bureaucrats to state and local governments. 
Secondly, it represented a unique attempt at comprehensively 
overhauling the national system for delivering jobs and 
occupational training. 
4 
Historical knowledge has value in that it may be 
applied to current or future events. Given that employment 
and training continues to be a critical policy area, and that 
CETA's enactment represents the last fundamental reform in 
that area ( i.e., reform based on policy philosophy), analy-
ses of future policy changes might be more successfully 
executed in light of an understanding of the CETA tormula-
tion. It is the object of this thesis to furnish that under-
standing. 
CHAPTER II 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE EMPLOYMENT A?m TRAINING SYSTEM 
For purposes of placing the 1973 reform in historical 
context, a summary sketch of U.S. employment and training 
programs is provided below. It is not intended as an ex-
haustive listing, but rather to highlight the mile-posts in 
the evolution of those programs. Because its formulation 
is the topic of this thesis, special emphasis is given to 
CETA. 
Aside from the establishment of the vocational educa-
tion system in 1917, federal programs !or jobs and training 
mainly date back to the New Deal. Chief among New Deal 
efforts were1 the public employment programs associated 
with the Civil Works Administration of 193J, the Public 
Works Administration of the same year and the Works Progress 
Administration of 1935 (J, pp. 88-89). Two other important 
New Deal policy formulations were represented by the Wagner-
Peyser Act of 1933 which established the federal-state 
employment service (for client referral and job placement), 
and the Fitzgerald Act of 1937 which started a national 
apprenticeship program (4, p. 11). While the employment 
service and the apprenticeship program (plus of course 
vocational education) remained after the era of Franklin D. 
Roosevelt, the public works programs "disappeared with the 
end of the Depression" ( 3, p. 89) • 
In 1946, the Employment Act was passed. It was con-
sidered a victory for liberals and organized labor. For 
the first time, the federal government accepted official 
responsibility for reducing unemployment. It was also sig-
nificant because it declared that labor supply and demand 
would henceforth be taken into account in government eco-
nomic policy (2). Yet, the Act did not mandate anything in 
the way of concrete job programs and was thus no more than 
a statement of intent for employment and training. 
6 
That statement was not soon backed up with action. As 
late as 1961, th~ federal employment and training system 
consisted of the employment service, the apprenticeship pro-
gram, vocational education and rehabilitation, and a farm 
labor import program, at a total cost of approximately $250 
million (5 1 p. 2). Despite the praiseworthy intentions put 
forth in the Employment Act, that system was basically the 
one inherited from FDR (minus public service employment). 
Problems such as technology-induced job dislocation and 
urban economic stagnation were becoming more pronounced 
every year, providing a clear stimulus to further federal 
efforts in the 1960s. 
Beginning in 1961, and continuing through both the 
Kennedy and Johnson administrations, a new wave of programs 
issued from Washington, D. C. The Area Redevelopment Act 
7 
(ARA) of 1961 was aimed at economically depressed parts of 
the country and disadvantaged clients, such as youth and 
minorities. It provided income, training and supportive 
services for those clients (6, p. 1)21 7, p. 7). The 
Accelerated Public Works Act of 1962 authorized funding fora 
••• the construction of job-producing public works 
in 'depressed' areas eligible for ARA funds--as well 
as those areas that had suffered over 6 percent un-
employment during the previous twelve months 
(7, p. 9). 
The Manpower Development and Training Act (MDTA) of 1962 was 
originally intended as a remedy for job dislocation in an 
increasingly automated economy. It was amended over the en-
suing years in order to broaden its scope to include more 
socially disadvantaged clients (5, p. J). The "first real 
examination of vocational education legislation since 1917" 
occurred in 1963 (8, p. 311), when that training program was 
updated. The Economic Opportunity Act (EOA), which was 
"largely a package of manpower programs aimed at providing 
jobs or preparing the employable poor for jobs," became law 
in 1964 (5, p. 4). Then, in 1967, a program of work incen-
tives, to help persons on welfare in finding jobs, was 
created by amending the Social Security Act, originally en-
acted in 1935 (6, p. 132; 4, p. 11). Beside legislation 
with provisions establishing employment and training pro-
grams, the 1960s saw the passage of laws directly relating 
to such programs. For example, the 1964 Civil Rights Act 
contained titles to ensure "nondiscrimination in programs 
8 
assisted with federal dollars" as well as "equal employment 
opportunity" (9, p. 169). 
Programs of the 1960s, like those just mentioned, with 
their anti-poverty emphasis, were often referred to as build-
ing blocks of a "Great Society." Roger H. Davidson (5, 
p. 2) uses another phrase to describe those efforts. He 
refers to them as a "second New Deal." In their discussion 
of ARA and EOA, Reagan and Sanzone (6, p. 132) states 
"The acts established a new level of federal intervention in 
labor market affairs, far beyond the vocational education 
grants that had been instituted some 45 years earlier." In 
that decade, federal employment and training expenditures 
rose permanently out of the range of hundreds of millions of 
dollars and into the billions. Davidson (5, pp. 2-J) sees 
"meaning given to the Employment Act's commitment" in that 
decade. 
As stated above, CETA was a response to the unmanage-
abili ty of the categorical system. Aside from the Emergency 
Employment Act {EEA) of 1971, authorizing a two-year, anti-
recessionary public jobs program (10, p. 6), the early 1970s 
was a time of legislative stalemate. Various reform pro-
posals were debated and the result was CETA of 197), the 
purpose of which was1 
••• to provide job training and employment opportu-
nities for economically disadvantage, unemployed and 
underemployed persons ••• by establishing a flexible 
and decentralized system of Federal, State and local 
programs (11, p. 42206). 
9 
As enacted, CETA consisted of six titles, the first of 
which provided for basic grants to state and local government 
"prime sponsors" for "Comprehensive Manpower Services." 
Prime sponsors were defined ass (a) state governments, (b) 
general local governments of at least 100,000 population, 
(c) consortia of general local governments containing a 
member with 100,000 population, {d) general local govern-
ments (regardless of population) specially-designated by the 
Secretary of Labor as exhibiting "exceptional circumstances,• 
(e) certain general government and private grantees under 
the existing Concentrated Employment Program {11, p. 42206; 
12, p. J). The authorized services under Title I included 
virtually every conceivable employment and training activ-
i ty1 from counseling and referral to training and direct-
hiring (11, p. 42206). Prime sponsors could carry out 
these services on their own, or through other organizations 
with which contracts could be concluded (lJ, p. 14). Prime 
sponsors were required to submit a services plan, for 
approval by the Secretary of Labor, which had to ensure• 
that the objectives of the Act would be met, that "to the 
maximum extent feasible" low-income and other disadvantaged 
persons would be served, that the "need for continued fund-
ing of programs of demonstrated effectiveness is taken into 
account," that community organizations be involved in plan-
ning, that MDTA skills centers be used "to the extent 
feasible" in institutional training, that arrangements be 
10 
made for coordinating Labor Department-financed services 
which relate to employment and training and that •planning 
councils• be established in prime sponsorships to represent 
local interest groups and act in an advisory capacity 
(11, pp. 42206-71 13, p. 15). State sponsorships were 
charged with special responsibilities, such as the establish-
ment of a "State Manpower Services Council" for representing 
various interest groups within a state and for acting in an 
advisory fashion like its local counterparts, and the devel-
opment of a state plan for coordinating the activities of 
state agencies in the implementation of prime sponsors' 
plans (11, p. 42208), plus the choice of assisting vocational 
education (supported by funds earmarked in CETA) via agree-
ments to be made between state vocational education boards 
and prime sponsors in whose areas this activity would occur 
(11, p. 42209). Eighty percent of Title I funds were subject 
to a disbursement formulas 50~ of this money was to be 
allocated among states (and then among sponsorships within 
a state) according to the area's previous proportion of 
federal employment and training assistance, 37.5% of this 
money was to be allotted according to an area's proportion 
of unemployed people, 12.5% according to the proportion 
of adults in "low-income" families (11, p. 42207). By "low-
income" was meant an annual income below $7,000 "with 
respect to income in 1969," adjusted in proportion to changes 
in the Consumer Price Index (ll, p. 42217). In addition, 
11 
1% of the above funds were available for the Secretary of 
Labor to allocate, based on the above formula, among states 
to pay either for the State Manpower Services Councils or 
state services (depending on a state's needs). The remain-
ing funds under this title were designated for vocational 
education (5% of Title I funds), state employment and train-
ing services (4%), the Secretary of Labor to promote local 
sponsor consortia (up to 5%), and Secretarial discretionary 
funds (at least 6%). The last was to be used, first to 
ensure that an area received at least 90% of the previous 
year's funding, and secondly to "take into account the need 
for funding programs of demonstrated effectiveness• (11, 
p. 42207). Finally, Title I contained procedural provi-
sions, most importantly specifying that Secretarial dis-
approval of sponsors' plans and actions (potentially result-
ing in loss of grant funds) be contingent upon findings 
arrived at in a hearing, and that disapprovals are subject 
to judicial review. The Secretary was also authorized to 
serve areas not being served by prime sponsors, either as 
a consequence of disapproval or of a lack of a qualified 
sponsor (11, pp. 42208-9). 
Title II "Public Employment Programs" were authorized 
to provide "transitional• jobs in public service to the un-
employed and underemployed (11, p. 42209}. Both Title I 
prime sponsors and native American tribes on U.S. or state 
reservations were eligible for Title II funding, if they 
contained "an area of substantial unemployment,• that isa 
••• any area of sufficient size and scope to sustain 
a public service employment program and which has 
a rate of unemployment equal to or in excess of 6.5 
per centum for three consecutive months as deter-
mined by the Secretary (11, p. 42209). 
If a general local government of less than 100,000 popula-
tion, but over 50,000, contained such an area, the sponsor 
12 
with jurisdiction was to designate that government as a 
':Program agent• for public employment. Program agents were 
responsible for "developing, funding, overseeing, and moni-
toring programs" in the high-unemployment area, in con-
gruence with the sponsor's application for federal assist-
ance (which itself was to be a cooperative venture between 
sponsor and agent (11, p. 42209). Only persons living in 
the high unemployment areas, and without a job for at least 
30 days, could qualify as clients. Also, "where appropri-
ate, training and manpower services related to such employ-
ment" and which were •otherwise unavailable,• were to be pro-
vided. Furthermore, Title II jobs had to be in "needed pub-
lic services" (11, p. 42210). This title also included 
guidelines calling for special emphasis on veterans of 
Indochina and Korea, as well as on those unemployed the 
longest. Other guidelines prohibited various administrative 
and fiscal manipulations, such as substitution of Title II 
money for other revenues. The Secretary of Labor was also 
authorized to review the implementation practices of sponsors 
lJ 
(11, pp. 42210-11). Eighty percent of Title II disbursements 
were to be made according to the proportion of unemployed 
persons in each area of high unemployment relative to the 
total number in all such areas, and the remaining 20% was to 
be distributed at the Secretary of Labor's discretion "taking 
into account the severity of unemployment within such areas" 
(11, p. 42209). Finally, and perhaps most importantly, 
governmental (and tribal) recipients were allowed to decide 
whether to apply Title II funds to public employment or any 
other activity authorized by Title I or Title III-A 
(11, p. 42211). 
Title III Part A was the part of CETA under which the 
Secretary of Labor was to operate employment and training 
programs for "Special Target Groups," including youth, 
offenders, persons of limited English-speaking ability, 
older workers, native Americans and migrant and seasonal 
farmworkers, as well as for areas suffering excessive un-
employment, poverty or labor-supply problems (11, pp. 42211-
12). While not all of the above classifications had pro-
grams spelled out for them, native American programs were 
guaranteed a funding level equal to at least 4% of the sum 
allotted under the basic Title I disbursement to prime 
sponsors, and migrant and seasonal farmworker programs were 
guaranteed an amount equal to at least 5% of that disburse-
ment (11, p. 42212). Part B of Title III gave the Secretary 
of Labor responsibility for a variety of research, demon-
14 
stration, evaluation and labor market information functions 
(11, pp. 42212-13). 
Title IV continued the Job Corps under the Department 
of Labor (formerly authorized by EOA). This program was 
clearly targeted on •1ow-income disadvantaged young men and 
women" and contained a host of procedural standards for its 
implementation (11, 42213-171 13, p. 16). 
The remaining two titles of CETA of 1973 contained 
provisions which• (a) established a National Commission for 
Manpower Policy, to be comprised of representatives of six 
· different federal departments and agencies as well as eleven 
other personss 
••• broadly representative of labor, industry, com-
merce, education ••• State and local elected offi-
cials ••• persons serv9d by manpower programs and of 
the general public (to be] appointed by the Presi-
dent (11, pp. 42217-19), 
and (b) set forth basic definitions and prohibitions for 
CETA. The Commission's task was to study employment and 
training problems, conduct program evaluations and make recom-
mendations to the President and Congress (11, pp. 42217-19). 
After CETA was enacted, employment and training legis-
lation tended toward a series of revisions or enhancements 
of what came to be called the •cETA system" (10, p. 8). In 
1974, a new Title VI was added in order to expand public 
job-creation in the face of continued recession (6, p. 133). 
In 1976, CETA was amended to target more upon the socially 
disadvantaged. As a result, certain client eligibility 
15 
requirements were tightened (8, p. 32J). In 1977. the Youth 
Employment and Demonstration Projects Act was passed, adding 
Title VIII to CETA and providing several programs for younger 
clients (8, p. 32J). Also that year, tax incentive (10, p. 8) 
and employer wage subsidy provisions (14, p. 172) were append-
ed in hopes of easing hiring. Then, in 1978, the year of 
CETA's reauthorization, a new Title VII appeared. It was in-
tended to increase the role of the business sector in employ-
ment and training (8, p. 323). Additionally, 1978 saw a new 
tax credit feature (10, p. 8) and tighter client eligibility 
requirements tacked on (8, p. 32J). The new eligibility 
rules narrowed CETA's emphasis down to the more obviously 
disadvantaged clients. These rules, in combination with the 
narrowing effects of the 1976 amendment, contributed to a 
degree of •recategorization• of CETA (8, p. J2J). 
In order to fully un~erstand the development of em-
ployment and training programs, it is important to grasp the 
scale of those programs. The dramatic increase in the 
federal employment and training effort, beginning in the 
early 1960s, can be illustrated in several ways, depending 
upon the choice of definition. Davidson's (5, p. 2) defini-
tion is a broad one, and includes the placement and referral 
functions of the u. s. Training and Employment Service as 
well as programs which are not simply under Department of 
Labor (DOL) jurisdiction. For example, vocational education 
had traditionally been tied to the Department of Health, 
16 
Education and Welfare (HEW). According to Davidson (5, p. 2). 
the cost of federally-sponsored employment and training 
efforts rose from the above-mentioned $250 million in 1961 
to about $4 billion by the end of that decade. Eli Ginzberg 
(10, p. )) assesses •employment and training, narrowly de-
fined as programs under the jurisdiction of the U.S. Depart-
ment of Labor." This is a useful definition, since DOL 
has been the administrative focal point of programs designed 
to remedy unemployment and underemployment. According to 
Ginzberg (10, p. )), appropriations climbed from $81 million 
in 1963 to about $11 billion in 1979, a •130-fold increase." 
Government statistics also portray this mushrooming 
phenomenon. Federal financial "obligations• and new client 
enrollments for DOL employment and training programs, 
cumulatively for 1963-66, came to approximately $1.2 billion 
and 1,065,000 respectively. In 1967 alone, these numbers 
were about $0.8 billion and over 800,000. In 1969, the 
figures passed the $1 billion and one million persons marks, 
and by 1973, the year of CETA's enactment, obligations were 
over $2.75 billion and enrollments were at about 1,538,000 
(15, p. 317). During the late 1970s and early 1980s, 
annual obligations ranged from about $5-10.6 billion, while 
enrollments ranged from about 3.2 to over 4 million persons 
(16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21). The expansion of activities 
under MDTA, one of the most important Acts of Congress in 
this policy area, and one with programs administered by 
17 
both DOL and HEW, provides another indication of growth. 
Enrollments in these (primarily training-oriented) programs 
started at about J4,ooo in 196J, and more than quadrupled in 
two years (approximately 157,000 in 1965). These enrollment 
levels stood at over 200,000 per year until 1973 (15, p. 320) 
when MDTA was replaced by CETA.- Annual appropriations 
started at about $70 million, rising to the $400 million 
range in the late 1960s (22, p. JJ). Work and training pro-
grams of EOA, another key Act in this respect, displayed a 
similar expansion, with appropriations nearly tripling be-
tween 1965 and 1969, approaching the $1 billion range 
(4, p. 27). 
In the 1970s, CETA had become the distinctive new 
force in federal employment and training policy. Speaking 
only of "employment,• as opposed to training, Bruce K. 
MacLaury (23, i) says that the 1970s "witnessed a dramatic 
growth in federal support• for such programs. According to 
him a 
Federal outlays for this purpose rose from less than 
$1 billion annually in the early 1970s to an annual 
average of about $7 billion in 1978-81. The vast 
bulk of these expenditures was for public service 
employment, primarily through grants to state and 
local governments under the Comprehensive Employment 
and Training Act (2,, i). 
CETA's national administrative responsibilities were handled 
primarily by DOL. In fiscal 1975, the first full year of 
CETA operations, DOL "Obligations for Work and Training 
Programs" (emphasis added) stood at approximately $4.l 
18 
billion--nearly $4 billion of which went for CETA (24, 
p. 339). Through the rest of the 1970s and into the early 
1980s, CETA's proportion of DOL work and training obliga-
tions was similarly higha roughly $5.9 billion out of $7.4 
billion for fiscal 1978 (18, p. 364), $8.3 billion out of 
$8.8 billion for fiscal 1980 (20, p. 257). CETA's shares 
of new enrollments were likewise high (16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 
21, 24). The Act had become the umbrella under which policy 
innovations took their place. 
However, charges of waste and fraud made against CETA 
had been accumulating in the late 1970s. In an increasing-
ly budget-conscious and conservative atmosphere, that 
spelled trouble for the "CETA system" (10, p. 8) and the 
result was the 1981 elimination of the public employment 
program. Only training remained, at reduced levels of fund-
ing (25, p. 2519). The Act which gave shape to federal em-
ployment and training assistance for nearly a decade was 
relegated to the history books on October 1, 1983 (26, 
pp. 68-9). It was replaced by the Job Training Partnership 
Act, which draws heavily upon the conceptual basis of CETA, 
though emphasizing the roles of private industry and state 
governments more so than its predecessor (27, p. 2428; 
28, p. 968). 
CHAPTER III 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
While seemingly countless, brief references to the 
1973 reform are abundant. Only eight treatments of the 
subject capable of providing any insight into the factors 
determining the legislative outcome exist. Of these, five 
touch upon the CETA formulation in the process of dealing 
with broader topics and, as a result, lack the depth and 
inclusiveness necessary to a complete understanding of that 
formulation. One piece, by Guttman (13), is a short assess-
ment of the implications of CETA for intergovernmental re-
lations. Another piece, by Levitan and Zickler (29), 
while offering some clues as to how CETA was created, em-
phasizes what was created more so than how. A discussion 
by Culhane {JO) has the general subject of this paper as 
its central theme. Yet, while enlightening the reader 
about phenomena leading to the 1973 legislation, it tends 
more toward being a report on key bargaining sessions than 
an extensive analysis of a policy formulation. 
In spite of the dearth of information in the litera-
ture, with respect to the root causes of the CETA reform, 
the above-mentioned writings provide guidance for a fuller 
investigation. Several developments of the late 1960s and 
early 1970s, pointing toward the enactment of CETA, were 
consistently mentioned. They werea (a) the unmanage-
abili ty of the employment and training delivery system, 
(b) the antipathy which the Nixon Administration had 
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aroused among many actors by its behavior, (c) the increas-
ing need, by virtually all interested actors, to strike a 
compromise, (d) the appeal which the concepts of decentrali-
zation and decategorization had acquired, (e) the need to 
reconcile the opinion gap over the degree to which reform 
should be anti-poverty oriented, (f) the need to reconcile 
another opinion gap concerning the desirability of public 
job-creation, and (g) the rise in influence of certain 
groups, with respect to employment and training policy, 
occurring concomitantly with a decline in such influence 
for other groups. Recognition of these developments helped 
give form to the analytical framework of this thesis. The 
first three showed the importance of contextual elements. 
The next three pointed up the relevance of ideas and beliefs, 
and the last development called attention to the interplay 
of group interests. 
The unmanageability of the employment and training 
delivery system toward the end of the 1960s is the object 
of repeated treatment in the literature. Mirengoff and 
Rindler (Jl, p. 2) speak of the interagency competition for 
resources and clients, the wasteful duplication of effort 
and the inflexibility of a system based upon roughly 10,000 
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individual projects. Van Horn (J2, p. 77) mentions duplica-
tion of effort, interagency competition and inappropriate 
services. He characterizes the system as uncoordinated, by 
stating, "Lacking any single coordinating authority, the 
structure of employment and training programs in most commu-
nities before CETA was highly fragmented." A report of the 
Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR) 
(1, p. 1) describes the pre-CETA system for implementation 
as "a patchwork of programs lacking a policy framework." 
According to Culhane (JO, p. 51), the many categorical pro-
grams in an area were "uncoordinated" with the local labor 
market. These assessments are corroborated by Levitan and 
Zickler (29) and Reagan and Sanzone (6). 
That unmanageable system set the backdrop for the 
policy revision to come. However, the behavior of the Nixon 
Administration, in general, and also specifically regarding 
employment and training, helped catalyze reform efforts. 
The general discontent is touched upon later in this paper, 
but the employment and training aspect warrants attention 
here. Long advocating the decentralization and decategor-
ization philosophy, and frustrated by Congressional intran-
sigence, the Nixon Administration (through the Department 
of Labor) tried to change the delivery system via executive 
order alone in 1973. This action aroused anger in a host 
of involved actors, stimulating efforts outside the Admin-
istration at devising a viable reform bill. Culhane 
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(JO, pp. 52-5J) reports that the actions of DOL, in this 
respect, consituted an important stimulus for moving members 
of Congress to act, and that state and local governments 
"unanimously opposed changes in the program through a series 
of executive actions.• According to Van Horn (J2, p. 64), 
state and local governments, operators of categorical pro-
grams and members of Congress all protested DOL's inten-
tions vigorously. The ACIR (1, p. 10) substantiates this 
development. 
A closely related development, receiving mention in 
the literature, was the increasing need by participants in 
employment and training to arrive at a compromise, yielding 
viable reform legislation. Culhane {JO, p. 55) reports that 
two major employment and training laws (The Manpower Develop-
ment and Training Act of 1962, and the Emergency Employment 
Act of 1971) were ready to expire in mid-1973. These laws 
carried authorizations for categorical programs plus anti-
recessionary public hiring, which were considered of critical 
value to many organizations and their Congressional repre-
sentatives. The pending expiration of these pieces of 
legislation, along with the threatened actions of DOL, stimu-
late legislative activity on Capitol Hill "in consultation 
with the administration" (1, p. 10). The end result was a 
comprehensive replacement bill {CETA), which was a "compro-
mise," and one in which "a Presidential veto could be 
avoided" (1, p. 16). Van Horn (32, p. 64) describes 
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pressures to compromise being exerted upon both pro-categori-
cal members of Congress (and their constituents) .!!!!_ the 
Nixon Administration. According to this account, the Admin-
istration finally ceased its threatened executive imposition 
of reform and conceded some categorical provisions in CETA, 
plus public employment (which it had opposed), in return for 
Congressional acceptance of decentralization and decategori-
zation. 
While many groups were averse to the methods of the 
Nixon Administration, not all of them disagreed with its 
goals of decentralization and decategorization--as long as 
these goals were realized via legislative means. Gradually, 
more and more participants in the employment and training 
system came to embrace these ends as appropriate remedies 
to the system's shortcomings. Culhane (JO, p. 52) empha-
sizes that support for decentralization and decategorization 
was significant among state and local government officials. 
The ACIR (1) corroborates this point. According to Levitan 
and Zickler (29, p. 191), these reform goals had broad 
appeal, as evidenced by the "bi-partisan" Congressional sup-
port for them. ~irengoff and Rindler (Jl, pp. 127-128) out-
line the basis of the broad appeal of the reform ideas by 
informing the reader that a much wider clientele population 
could be served under a decategorized setup. 
However, it was just that kind of intimation which 
frightened representatives of the poor and socially 
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disadvantaged. These people felt that only federally-
formulated and enforced rules would guarantee their con-
stituents a fair shake. Hence, they were disturbed at the 
prospect of turning control over to states and localities. 
The possible loss of redistributive potential (i.e., an anti-
poverty purpose) in employment and training programs was what 
caused them to take a strong interest in the pending reform. 
That CETA was influenced by these groups, who fought a rear-
guard action at the time, is a fact born out by the litera-
ture. Mirengoff and Rindler (31, pp. 112-115) report that 
such organizations saw a "threat" in decentralization and 
decategorization, though the same authors indicate that CETA 
partly embrace4 the interests of these groups. The ACIR 
(1, p. 11) also mentions the anti-poverty element, by noting 
that during the reform debate "some sentiment was voiced in 
favor of retaining at the national level certain specialized 
programs," for the poor and disadvantaged minorities. The 
same study concludes that, while CETA did take significant 
account of the above sectors of the population in its lan-
guage, the compromise quality of the bill "contributed to 
uncertainties about how the act would be implemented" 
(1, pp. 17-18). In Van Horn's opinion (32, p. 157), Con-
gress walked a "tightrope" between redistributive and dis-
tributive (i.e., broad subsidy, without a clear an:ti-poverty 
focus) considerations in formulating CETA. Yet, Van Horn 
(32, pp. 156-159) concludes that the outcome leaned more to 
the distributive side of that tightrope. Ripley and 
Franklin (9, pp. 172-176) and Levitan and Zickler (29, 
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pp. 193-4) agree with Van Horn that anti-poverty groups and 
others representing the disadvantaged influenced CETA, but 
not enough to be considered winners in the final outcome. 
Reagan and Sanzone (6, p. 135) express more confidence in 
the Act's capacity to address the problems of the disadvan-
taged. Those authors interpret some of CETA's language as 
being "a euphemistic way• of warning state and local offi-
cials not to neglect anti-poverty and related organizations. 
Another development found consistently in the litera-
ture, which fueled the reform debate, was the issue of 
public job-creation for the immediate alleviation of unem-
ployment. According to Ripley and Franklin (9, p. 174), 
liberals were traditionally in favor of public employment, 
and conservatives were traditionally against it. Culhane 
(JO, pp. 52-55) describes public employment as a question 
over which Congress and the Nixon Administration disagreed 
in a most fundamental way, and which was resolved by a com-
promise whereby such a program would be an allowable activity. 
However, a subnational government could allocate funds be-
tween it and other activities at its own discretion. Van 
Horn (32, pp. 6J-64) depicts the Administration as deeply 
opposed to the very idea of public job-creation. In his 
opinion, the White House came to see a concession on this 
issue as a useful tactic in extracting from Congress an 
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approval of decentralization and decategorization. Finally, 
in Guttman's (lJ, p. 13) opinion, public jobs advocates won 
a •deceptive" victory because of the Act's granting of the 
discretion referred to by Culhane above. 
The final development, during the late 1960s and 
early 1970s mentioned as significant to CETA's formulation, 
was the ascendance of certain groups' influence on employ-
ment and training occurring concomitantly with the descend-
ence of the influence of others. Mirengoff and Rindler 
(Jl, p. 48) speak of the gradually improving status of state 
and local governments in this substantive area. In the 
estimation of these writers, state and local governments 
were advancing their capacities for implementation during 
that period (e.g., their planning capacities). According to 
this source (31, p. 103), the federal-state employment ser-
vice was suffering from image problems in the 1960s. Spe-
cifically, the service was seen by many as being an old-line 
agency which was out of touch with the needs and values of 
poverty community clients. As a result, the service was 
losing influence in this policy area. The same authors (Jl) 
also imply that vocational and general educators, as well as 
established anti-poverty organizations, had been losing the 
preeminent positions in employment and training policy which 
they had once enjoyed (for a variety of reasons). In 
general, Mire~off & Rindler (31) reveal that subnational 
general governments (cities and counties in particular) 
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succeeded in supplanting the above groups, in terms of con-
trol over implementation, with the passage of CETA. 
Culhane (JO) implies that state and local governments {espe-
cially counties) had gained greater influence in the employ-
ment and training system, while anti-poverty agencies lost 
some, as evidenced by the provisions enacted in CETA. 
The other literature sources included in this review 
all contain references corroborating Mirengoff and Rindler 
(Jl) and Culhane (JO). In effect, these references indi-
cate that state and local general governments gained admin-
istrative territory in the formulation process, while anti-
poverty organizations, educational agencies and the federal-
state employment service all lost some (1, 6, 9, lJ, 29, 32). 
The main reason for this power shift was a double-edged one. 
On one hand, state and local general governments were im-
proving their capabilities and willingness to implement 
policy in an area where they had little prior experience. 
That lack of experience meant that those governments had 
little in the way of a reputation, good or ill, in employ-
ment and training, and thus appeared as fresh alternatives 
in the search for better system management. On the other 
hand, the "losers" all had implementation experience prior 
to CETA, but were, therefore, vulnerable to charges of fault 
in the on-going criticism of the system. Hence, they ap-
peared less trustworthy. 
To sum up, the literature consistently mentioned 
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certain developments in the late 1960s and early 1970s 
(outlined in the first paragraph of this review) which were 
of significance to the direction of reform. It was the 
recognition of these developments which guided this author 
in the further investigation of CETA's formulation. The 
combination of knowledge gained, from the above literature 
and that further investigation, then led to the establish-
ment of the analytical framework of this thesis. 
CHAPTER IV 
METHODOLOGY 
There do not appear to be any standard, well-defined 
methods for studying the formulation of public policy. Some 
authors emphasize the roles of individuals, other emphasize 
the roles of organizations. Some adhere to a strict chro-
nology, while others jump between points in time. Thus, it 
seemed appropriate to first look at the information avail-
able in the enactment of CETA, and then develop an analyt-
ical framework which would fit that information. rn this 
sense, the approach taken is an empirical one. Upon examina-
tion of the literature and documents on CETA's formulation, 
three major categories of factors contributing to the legis-
lative outcome were discerneda (a) contextual, (b)ideologi-
cal, and (c) actor objectives. Hence, the analytical frame-
work for this paper is broken down into these three classi-
fications of contributing factors. 
In order to fully apply the findings of this thesis, 
to current or upcoming formulations of employment and train-
ing policy, one must place equivalent factor categories from 
each time period alongside each other, and compare differ-
ences and similarities. Since the study of policy formula-
tion knows no broadly accepted frame of analysis, it is 
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likely that the breakdown used in this paper will not be 
exactly duplicated in studiee of current or future policy 
formulations. For example, a student of current policy may 
find "institutional factors• to be an appropriate category, 
rather than ideological factors. Nevertheless, it is felt 
that the approach taken here would remain useful in compar-
ative application for two reasons. First, this approach was 
derived from an investigation of a process which involved the 
whole gamut of issues and forces relevant to employment and 
training policy formulation. Many of these issues and forces 
have remained basically the same since the early 1970s. For 
example, public job-creation is an issue which is as unre-
solved now as it was ten years ago. Therefore, a good chance 
exists that an analysis of current or future formulation in 
this area might closely agree with the frame-work of this 
thesis, making a direct, or nearly direct, comparison of 
li~e-factors possible. Secondly, even if a study of current 
or future formulations is organized along quite different 
lines, there is liable to be room for modification to facil-
itate comparative analysis. So, for instance, if the hypo-
theti.cal student above considers •institutional factors" to 
be analytically useful, a comparison with the findings of 
this paper might be done by clarifying the institutional 
phenomena associated with the factors used here. Conversely, 
the context, ideologies and/or objectives associated with 
the "institutional factors" in the hypothetical study might 
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be elucidated. 
As stated above, an empirical approach was taken in 
developing the analytical format for this paper. The first 
step was to search the scientific and general literature for 
initial clues. Some treatments of CETA's formulation were 
located in short articles, others in books dealing with em-
ployment and training policy or American government. These 
helped to lay a conceptual foundation in this author's mind. 
The second empirical step was to investigate additional data 
sources, guided by the knowledge gained from the literature. 
These additional sources were both primary and non-primary 
in character and were selected with an eye toward better de-
fining the C!TA formulation in terms oft (a) its overall 
historical position, and (b) its place in the political 
arena of the early 1970s (i.e., the status of the pending 
reform with respect to relevant organizations, institutions, 
political parties, etc., at the time). 
The primary sources most heavily relied upon included• 
(a) records of hearing testimony on employment and training 
reform, conducted before committees of the U.S. Senate and 
House of Representatives in 1973, (b) letters and position 
statements submitted to members of Congress and the Nixon 
Administration, which were attached as evidence to the hear-
ing testimony, and (c) texts of Senate and House discourses 
on reform, found in the Congressional Record, mostly from 
the summer and autumn of 1973. It was decided that the 
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examination of Congressional documents should be confined to 
1973 because the literature indicated that, prior to that 
year, the positions of interested actors had been too far 
apart to have allowed anything resembling the CETA compro-
mise bill to have been produced. It was not until 1973 that 
policymakers and their constituents decided that obtaining 
passable legislation was a higher priority than satisfying 
some of their earlier demands. In that year, a fresh start 
was made on all sides of the issue, positions were signifi-
cantly moderated and CETA was conceived. 
CHAPTER V 
THE CONTEXT OF REFORM 
The environment in which CETA was born was character-
ized by three policy-relevant factors which affected reform 
proceedings. These factors consisted ofa (a) employment 
and training system constraints which became apparent from 
experiences with the programs of the 1960s and pre-CETA 
reform attempts, (b) the political climate of the late 
1960s and early 1970s, distinguished by antagonistic rela-
tionships between the Nixon Administration and various 
actors, as well as a declining faith in the ability of the 
federal government to solve problems, and (c) the state of 
the national economy in the early 1970s. Each of these 
factors will be discussed below, with respect to the ways 
in which they affected the direction of employment and 
training reform. 
SYSTEMIC CONSTRAINTS 
The heightened activism of the federal government in 
employment and training matters during the 1960s led to the 
establishment of a delivery system which was rich in com-
plexities and contradictions. The wave of employment and 
training programs of the 1960s can be seen as a collection 
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of separate responses, on the part of the government, to 
various interest groups (e.g., those representing organized 
labor or racial minorities) calling for accomodation of 
particular needs. Levitan (8, pp. 316-317) describes those 
programs as having been, in effect, thrown at problems by 
lawmakers loyal to specific constituencies. It is not sur-
prising then, that the delivery system inherited by the 
Nixon Administration and the reformers of the early 1970s 
defied common conceptualizations of rationality or effi-
ciency. 
There was an overall lack of coordination in the sys-
tem, evidenced by two noticeable symptoms. Duplication of 
effort by many service deliverers in a given area was one 
symptom. Such a phenomenon is, by definition, wasteful of 
resources. It would inevitably require more federal money, 
supervision and technical assistance (not to mention non-
federal resources) to keep several different agencies oper-
ating similar programs in a community, than it would to have 
a single agency handle the job. Separate organizations must 
have separate systems for financial accounting, personnel 
management, public relations, etc. That would be true even 
if the involved agencies did not see each other as competi-
tors. However, those participating in the "second New Deal" 
(5, p. 2) did often see each other that way (the second 
symptom). The result was an increased level of waste, from 
a societal standpoint, due to the expenditure of additional 
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resources on activities associated with inter-agency competi-
tion. For example, agencies in such a situation must spend 
time and money on building their image in the eyes of the 
public or government officials in order to be awarded grant 
funds which are too scarce to go around to every similar 
agency. Another example of such waste would be the withhold-
ing of information pertinent to a substantive policy area--
information which might conceivably be shared in a more ef-
ficient way. 
Such was the uncoordinated employment and training 
system of the 1960s. The system was based upon at least 
10,000 individual projects (Jl, p. 2) involving the federal 
government and various implementors, the latter including 
community action agencies*, union locals, civil rights organ-
izations and a host of other non-governmental entities, plus 
subnational governments, general and vocational educators 
and the u.s. Training and Employment Service. Yet, with all 
that exertion of administrative effort, the system still had 
holes into which clients fell, unable to obtain jobs or 
training. 
Ironically, the system which was so "highly fragment-
ed" (32, p. 77), was also overly-centralized. The categori-
cal programs of the 1960s were creatures of Congressional 
*CAAs1 locally-based anti-poverty organizations, 
originally under the aegis of the federal Office of Economic 
Opportunity, authorized by the EOA of 1964 (5, pp. 4-5a 
9, pp. 156-161). 
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legislation, modified by administrative regulations. DOL 
and HEW were responsible for promulgating most of those regu-
lations and for guiding implementation through regional 
offices. Between legislative provisions "targeting" certain 
groups as clients and service providers, and operational 
rules and program approval procedures, the categorical pro-
grams were relatively restrictive. For example, a city 
government receiving grant funds might only have been allow-
ed to spend them on training welfare recipients for partic-
ular kinds of jobs. For reasons like this, complaints devel-
oped to the effect that employment and training programs were 
being controlled by officials who were out of touch with the 
nuances of local situations. In addition, matching fund 
obligations were common, requiring state or local govern-
ments to invest their own revenues into projects funded by 
Washington to obtain a grant. These impositions of national 
priorities upon subnational jurisdictions led many partici-
pants in the employment and training programs of the 1960s 
to object to the "straightjacket effect" (8, p. Jl7) of 
categorical programs. 
Recognition of these shortcomings of the categorical 
system gave rise to thin.~ing about how to revise it. That 
thinking followed two general conceptual linesa first, the 
system had to be made more efficient1 secondly, it had to 
be made more responsive to the varying conditions of 
different geographical areas. 
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Ideas for improving the efficiency of the system aimed 
at eliminating the wasteful duplication of effort, inter-
agency competition and confusing plethora of regulations. 
The notion of consolidating programs under a fewer number of 
administering authorities was the most significant idea in 
this respect. While many different organizations in a given 
community would still be required for supplying the services 
and resources needed, tying them all together under the 
auspices of a single program sponsor was expected to yield 
better coordination. Given this kind of change, it was felt 
that many unproductive agencies would be weeded out of the 
system, and competition for contracts would result in the 
most able deliverers of particular services being the ones 
given the job by a sponsor. Competition would be kept out-
side the system, with only the winners taking their places 
inside the system, performing the functions for which they 
were best suited. Simplification of administration would be 
possible by reducing the number of federal grant recipients. 
In order to make the system more responsive, authority 
would have to be devolved from the national to the state and 
local levels (decentralization). Reform thinking tended to 
emphasize the roles of elected officials of subnational 
general governments, working on the assumption that these 
were better attuned to the needs of their citizens than were 
federal officials. In addition, discretion as to acceptable 
uses of funds would have to be increased (decategorization) 
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for grant recipients. This logic implied that, with respect 
to clients, providers and local conditions, it was state and 
local elected officials who knew best what to do, Working 
together with representatives of business, labor, the dis-
advantaged and established government agencies (e.g., voca-
tional schools) in a given geographic area, elected officials 
were expected to develop a set of programs which would be 
more responsive to that area's idiosyncracies. 
While the above reform ideas gained a large following 
in a few years' time, they also provoked opposition from many 
on ideological grounds and were perceived as threatening to 
established interests. Liberals saw them portending a fed-
eral retreat from the established practice of guaranteeing 
special consideration for the disadvantaged (something they 
did not believe subnational officials could be trusted to 
do), Operators of categorical programs feared a new system 
in which their role would come into question as subnational 
governments exercised discretion on matters of program con-
tent and service-provider contracting. Beyond that, even 
persons who agreed with the reform ideas had their differ-
ences with respect to how to actualize those ideas. The em-
ployment and training system was composed of a heterogeneous 
mixture of groups and it was apparent that the ability to 
compromise would be a useful talent as reform proceedings un-
folded. There was much to be learned about applying the 
reform concepts, and the experiences of several years of 
pre-CETA attempts at doing so served to expand such know-
ledge. 
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Enough enthusiasm for reform, along the lines just 
described, had built up {among state and local officials, 
ideological conservatives and federal executives) by the end 
of the Johnson Administration to make preliminary moves pos-
sible in 1967. That year saw Secretary of Labor Willard 
Wirtz establish the Concentrated Employment Program (CEP) 
{,, p. 6). Patricia Marshall had the following to say 
about CEPa 
Its goal was to pull together diverse programs at 
the local level under a single prime sponsor ••• and 
focus all resources upon defined areas of concen-
trated need. The CEP's generally were located in 
urban and rural poverty pockets, where manpower 
needs were extensive and complex. Usually, a com-
munity action agency was the prime sponsor for each 
CEP, and it .subcontracted with specialized agencies 
to get the training, health, job placement, and 
other services disadvantaged clients need to obtain 
work. In other instances, units of general govern-
ment were the prime sponsors of CEP (12, p. J). 
Marshall (12, pp. J-4) goes on to mention some of the prob-
lems with CEP. One was that it was implemented in a hurry, 
without careful attention to planning. Another was that an 
attempt was made to staff CEP with persons from the poverty 
communities intended to be served. Marshall implies that a 
lack of staff ties to the business sector was significant 
in limiting CEP's potential. Finally, CEP could not evolve 
into a system of areawide dimensions due to its focus upon 
relatively small target communities. 
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Another reform attempt in 1967 was the Cooperative 
Area Manpower Planning System (CAMPS). This was a multi-
layered planning structure, comprised of committees repre-
sentative of implementing agencies at the local, state and 
regional levels (5, pp. 6-7). However, these CAMPS commit-
tees never acquired sufficient authority to effect changes 
in the system, and served only as focal points for exchang-
ing ideas (12, p. 4s 5, pp. 6-7). 
In 1969, with Richard Nixon in office, the drive for 
reform picked up steam. The new President directed DOL to 
draw up a Manpower Training Act. It featured a strong state 
role, but was apparently too extreme in its degree of decen-
tralization, not only for a Democratic (and mostly pro-cate-
gorical) Congress, but even for state officials. Unsure 
about the whole thing, the latter failed to rally behind the 
Administration and the Manpower Training Act died from a 
lack of political support (5, pp. 18-29). Also in 1969, the 
Administration was pursuing a non-legislative route. It con-
sisted of providing planning grants to state and local gov-
ernments in order to build up their self-sufficiency in em-
ployment and training (12, p. 4). This proved to be an 
insightful move by the Administration. The improvement of 
state and local expertise in this policy area later turned 
out to be important in swaying opinions in favor of decen-
tralization and decategorization (JJ, 34). By 1973, those 
planning grants had reached a total of $16 million 
(12, p. 5) and were going to 126 cities, 50 states, four 
counties and 19 native American Tribes (8, pp. 318-319). 
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The 1970s began with a Presidential veto of a reform 
bill which had been passed by Congress and aimed at making 
the employment and training system more flexible, but con-
taining a fatal flaw from a legislative standpoint--a public 
jobs provision. President Nixon was too strongly opposed to 
public job-creation to sign the bill (10, p. 6). However, 
that impasse only slightly dampened reform efforts. The Ad-
ministration pursued reform on both the legislative and bu-
reaucratic fronts. It proposed another billa the Manpower 
Revenue Sharing Act of 1971. That bill, like the earlier 
Administration proposal, died because it offended Congress 
with notions like the allocation of funds by entitlement 
(instead of the usual application for DOL approval), the 
elimination or matching requirements, and an overall reduc-
tion of the federal role in implementation (l, pp. 8-9). On 
the bureaucratic front, CAMPS was revised in 1971 to broaden 
the membership of its committees to include a greater vari-
ety of interests and give them more authority with respect 
to the determination of areal needs. Additionally, DOL of-
fices were told to "base their funding actions on [committee] 
plans as much as possible," and to expect that, by 1974, 
state and local plans would be treated as "funding direc-
tives" (12, p. 4). 
The Emergency Employment Act (EEA) was passed in 1971 
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(8, p. 315), and was significant for two reasons. First it 
represented a Nixon Administration concession, allowing pub-
lic employment, to cope with rising unemployment due to a 
recessionary economy (authorized at $2.25 billion for two 
years). Secondly, it represented a Congressional concession, 
allowing a major increase in the discretion of state and 
local governments, who were to implement it (8, p. 315). Ac-
cording to Mirengoff and Rindlera 
It was not until passage of the Emergency Employment 
Act (EEA) of 1971 that government units (states, 
cities, counties) were given direct control over the 
funding and operation of a major manpower program. 
EEA thus constituted a stepping stone in the decen-
tralization of manpower programs (Jl, p. 69). 
An initiative taken by the Administration, in 1973, 
which complemented (on a smaller scale) the EBA experience, 
was the setting up of pilot projects known as Comprehensive 
Manpower Programs (CMPs). DOL officials selecteda 
••• three States (South Carolina, Utah, and New 
Hampshire), Luzerne County [PaJ, and five cities 
or consortia of local governments whose boundaries 
were roughly congruent with a labor market area ••• 
(12, p. 8), 
to act in a prime sponsor capacity. In the CMPs, categori-
cals originally authorized under MDTA and EOA were "phased 
into" the pilot prime sponsorships. This was done either 
through choosing specific grants whose contract time was ex-
piring, or through negotiation with the state and local gov-
ernments involved. However, this DOL effort became obsolete 
when CETA was passed at the end of the year (12, pp. 8-9). 
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By 197J, however, the Nixon Administration had become 
so frustrated with Congressional stubbornness about allowing 
decentralization and decategorization, that it decided to go 
for reform via the bureaucratic route only. DOL had been 
preparing a plan for instituting overall decentralization, 
decategorization and consolidation through administrative 
rule changes. The White House and DOL seemed intent on ex-
ecuting the plan if comprehensive legislation was not forth-
coming. Consisting of the same reform concepts already dis-
cussed in this paper, such as state and local government 
prime sponsorships (33, pp. 280-281), the plan infuriated an 
assortment of actors outside the Administration. This at-
tempted executive action was perceived as intolerable by 
members of Congress, state and local governments, and oper-
ators of categorical programs alike (32, p. 64). Procedur-
ally, it was considered by many to be an outrageous, and 
possibly illegal, abuse of executive powers. However, it 
appears that the plan was mainly intended to pressure Con-
gress into a legislative compromise. Late in 1973, break-
throughs in negotiations between the Administration and 
Capitol Hill, on a comprehensive bill, began to be made. 
Accordingly, DOL shelved the executive strategy {JO, pp. 
54-55). 
What was learned by those interested in employment 
and training, from the above reform attempts, with respect 
to h.Q!! best to decentralize, decategorize and consolidate? 
The CEP experience was the point of origin for the 
prime sponsor idea. However, CEP prime sponsorships were 
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too narrow; internally in their staff makeup, and externally 
in their jurisdictional scope. Poverty community personnel 
alone were not sufficient because, in order to operate a con-
solidated local system, business, labor, government and other 
sectors would have to be brought into the picture. Limiting 
sponsorshipa• jurisdiction to a small target location (in 
this case, "urban and rural poverty pockets") was also in-
adequate. This was because such locations seldom account 
for the entirety of labor market dynamics in an area. Final-
ly, the CEP experience reminded participants of the old 
adage, "haste makes waste," by pointing up the importance of 
the careful consideration of strategy, prior to starting a 
new program. 
CAMPS taught a lesson of a different kind. The initial 
lack of authority on the part of its planning bodies made 
those bodies impotent. However, in its capacity as a forum 
for the exchange of ideas and raising of issues, CAMPS helped 
educate subnational officials as to the operation and coor-
dination of employment and training programs. 
The lessons learned from the pre-CETA reform efforts 
made by the Nixon White House and DOL were both political 
and administrative in nature. On the political side, it was 
made clear, by negative Congressional responses to early leg-
islative proposals, that drastic changes could not be imposed 
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upon existing circles of interest. Extensive devolution of 
program control to state and local governments, even through 
legislation, was simply too much for many constituencies to 
bear. Successful legislation would have to be more moderate, 
providing for some decentralization and decategorization, but 
leaving enough targeting and federal control intact to satis-
fy interest groups who felt the latter were necessary. Also, 
executive action without legislation was too alarming for 
many. While DOL's executive action plan seemed mainly in-
tended to stimulate Congress into a compromise on comprehen-
sive legislation, the Administration appeared to this author 
as quite ready to forge ahead without a bill. Yet, once op-
position to such an intention built up momentum, it became 
clear that a wholly bureaucratic approach to reform was po-
litically impossible. In terms of administrative lessons, 
DOL's gradual fostering of the technical capacities of sub-
national governments helped to make those units appear to be 
ready to handle sponsorship responsibilities (12, 33, 34). 
The "hands-on" practice which subnational governments 
experienced under EEA and the pilot CMPs, was indispensable 
for the decentralization process. Marshall (12, p. 6) cites 
the involvement of states and localities in fund distribu-
tion, job-creation and staff recruitment and training under 
EEA as significants "In many localities, [EEA's public em-
ployment program] was the only manpower program elected of-
ficials were directly familiar with." The CMPs were helpful 
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to the extent that they provided "a testing ground for ad-
ministrative systems and procedures for a further decentral-
ized effort,• and "experience in dealing with a variety of 
problems, given the various forms of government, multijuris-
dictional arrangements, staff capabilities, areas to be 
served, and the like," which reform would have to take into 
account (12, p. 8). 
Finally, DOL itself learned much about what would or 
would not fly, during the course of preparing state and 
local sponsors for greater responsibility. That activity 
involved the Department's national and regional offices in 
disseminating information, developing guidelines for program 
operation and coordinating various governmental entities in 
anticipation of a coming system overhaul (12, p. 9). 
The totality of the experiences of the "second New 
Deal" (5, p. 2) and pre-CETA reform attempts educated par-
ticipants in implementation as to the systemic constraints 
within which reform could be realized. However, programs do 
not arise in a social vacuum. Broader political trends in-
fluence their development. In the next section, such trends 
are examined in order to understand their impact upon the 
reform process. 
POLITICAL CLIMATE 
The years in which employment and training reform 
developed were characterized by a great deal of antagonism 
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between the Nixon Administration and various other actors, 
especially Congress. The Administration's methods of re-
lating to Congress were often perceived by members of the 
latter institution as worthy of scorn. The Administration 
was seen as uncooperative and insufficiently concerned with 
Congressional sentiment. As Randall B. Ripley statesa 
President Nixon and his closest advisers had poor 
relations with Congress much of the time. Con-
gress felt it was being pushed around and/or ig-
nored as Nixon tried to accomplish hid policy 
goals (35, p. 305). 
Particularly irksome to Senators and Representatives, was 
the Administration's penchant for circumventing the legis-
lative branch entirely. Members of Congress felt insulted 
by executive actions, like the one pertaining to employment 
and training policy, or, more spectacularly, like the ones 
associated with the Watergate affair. Ripley substantiates 
this a 
Thus when the Watergate scandal broke, congres-
sional opinion was that now Congress could and 
would recoup both lost prestige and power. The 
Watergate affair provided the opportunity for 
Congress to reassert itself, but such a move 
would have occurred even without Watergate, for 
many members of Congress indicated that President 
Nixon and the White House staff had gone too far 
in trying to legislate without Congress (35, p. 
305). 
In addition to its methods of relating to Congress, 
beliefs underlying the Administration's approach to the rest 
of the government implied potential conflict. Charles o. 
Jones (')6, pp. 230-231) assesses those beliefs by informing 
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readers that President Nixon only .felt accountable to the 
majority of voters who had elected him to office, not to 
Congress or other institutions. Jones (36, p. 230) elabo-
rates upon the President's philosophy by bringing attention 
to his conservatisma •As a Republican with a Democratic 
Congress and a New Deal bureaucracy, Nixon was, in his view, 
mandated to fight the good fight, against overwhelming odds.• 
Many groups outside of federal institutions experi-
enced conflicting relationships with the Administration too. 
In that era, which witnessed battles over executive impound-
ment of funds, war powers and cuts in social programs, the 
Administration's priorities and tactics aroused consternation 
aplenty. Ripley & Franklin (9) report numerous cases of con-
troversy between the Administration on the one hand, and 
liberals, organized labor and foreign policy "doves• on the 
other. Those controversies often concerned basic budgetary 
priorities and long-term social objectives. The case of 
President Nixon's attempt to liquidate one of the bulwarks 
of the 1960s War on Poverty (the Office of Economic Opportu-
nity--OEO}, illustrates the profundity of such conflictsa 
In 1973 Nixon appointed andacting director of OEO 
(without Senate confirmation) specifically to dis-
mantle the agency and to transfer certain of its 
programs to other agencies. At the same time, he 
sent his budget for fiscal year 1974 to Congress. 
In it no money was requested for OEO as an agency 
(although it was authorized through June of 1974}. 
The budget proposed placing OEO's legal services in 
a separate corporation, transferring certain OEO pro-
grams to other agencies ••• and allowing the comm.unity 
action programs to expire with no request for any 
funding at all. This executive action sent threat-
ened community action agencies and employee unions 
to the courts, where a judge ruled that no budget 
message could overrule a legislative authorization. 
The actions of the acting director were declared 
null and void, and he was declared to be illegally 
appointed (9, pp. 160-161). 
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Another characteristic of the political climate, dur-
ing the period of employment and training reform, was that 
the faith of the 1960s in the federal government as a prob-
lem solver had seriously deteriorated. Conservatives, and 
even some liberals, were becoming critical of the illogic of 
federal rules. Many of the categorical programs of the 1960s 
were being attacked as harbors of corruption. Protests on 
the left, which had called for federal action on behalf of 
disadvantaged minorities were losing steam by the time the 
1970s arrived. Levitan and Zickler (29, p. 191) identify 
the many different groups with an interest in employment and 
and training at that point in times civil rights organiza-
tions, unions, educational associations and community organ-
izations--clearly not all dyed-in-the-wool conservatives. 
Yet, accordi~.g to those authors (29, p. 191), "These diverse 
organizations tended to oppose encroachment of the federal 
bureaucracies into their domains while demanding federal 
dollars." The mood of the •second New Deal" (5, p. 2) was 
waning and the mass of federal regulations was stimulating a 
"reaction• (3, pp. 104-105) to the "overload" (J, pp. 6-lJ) 
in the federal system. The overload was associated with ex-
cessive federal intervention. President Nixon's efforts to 
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streamline federal bureaucracy implied that the reaction had 
"set in" by 1969 (J, pp. 104-105). Nixon's 1972 landslide 
victory in the presidential race against Senator George 
McGovern (a proponent of federal social programs) is perhaps 
the most impressive indicator of the political climate of 
the time. 
The climate characterized by the above relationships 
between the Administration and various other groups, as well 
as by a national mood leaning toward conservatism, held im-
plications for employment and training policys namely, that 
the pace of reform was to be affected, and that the quality 
of reform was conditioned by that climate. 
The pace of reform was inhibited at first by the po-
litical climate. From 1969 until 19?3, the gulf separating 
the Democratic Congress (and its pro-categorical constitu-
ents) from the Nixon Administration prevented any legisla-
tive compromise from being reached. On the bureaucratic 
front, while the Administration made several efforts at 
building the capacities of state and local governments for 
running programs, the political atmosphere could only work 
to retard such efforts. The wariness with which members of 
Congress and liberal interest groups watched the Administra-
tion• a shuffling of funds and regulations guaranteed that 
bureaucratic~lly-imposed changes would not get very far. 
However, the pace of reform was accelerated quickly 
in 1973, when DOL threatened to refurbish the employment 
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and training system to its own liking, without seeking Con-
gressional approval. In the words of the ACIR reports 
The attempt to blur, if not eliminate, the lines be-
tween categorical programs through administrative 
actions proved successful in motivating supporters 
and defenders of the manpower status quo in the Con-
gress· to rise to the occasion ( 1, p. 10). 
According to Van Horn (J2, p. 64), Congress, anti-poverty 
groups, and state and local government officials were alarm-
ed by the Administration's behavior. Across the political 
spectrum, nearly everyone with a stake in employment and 
training was roused to action--ready to compromise in order 
to work out viable legislation. 
The quality of reform was conditioned by the political 
climate to a large extent. Ot course, the basic decentral-
ist thrust was supported by the discontent with federal so-
lutions to problems. In addition, the political climate en-
sured that categorical targeting upon disadvantaged clients 
and anti-poverty organizations (as service providers) would 
not receive as much sympathy in reform proposals as it had 
in the past. However, such a climate did stimulate defend-
ers of the 1960s' approach to fight hard for their interests 
and try to blunt the edge of the reform movement. Given the 
influence which these people still had on Capitol Hill, this 
would have the effect of forcing a significant degree of 
compromise on the part of the reformers if a passable bill 
were to be produced. Nevertheless, a new policy orientation 
was developing, for employment and training as well as for 
other substantive areas. David B. Walker summarizes that 
orientation a 
It was ostensibly anticentralization, anticategor-
ical, and anti-administrative confusion. In posi-
tive terms, it supporteda greater decentraliza-
tion within the federal departments to their field 
unitss a devolution of more power and greater dis-
cretion to recipient unites a streamlining of the 
service delivery system generally1 a definite pre-
ferring of general governments and their elected 
officials; and some sorting out of some servicing 




The 1960s was a period of economic growth and escalat-
ing federal expenditures. According to Adam Smith (37, p. 
20), the national economy was "running at full capacity" in 
1965. Ginzberg (10, p. 6) reports that it was expanding up 
until 1969. Federal spending on both Vietnam and Great So-
ciety programs was also on the rise. Under these conditions, 
unemployment was not widely perceived as a priority issue, 
although inner-city or rural poverty areas exhibited a 
structural form of unemployment (i.e., deriving from social 
and institutional characteristics, as opposed to deriving 
from cyclical economic fluctuations). Inflation remained at 
a safe 1-2% until mid-decade, but then began to climb as a 
consequence of high spending (J?, pp. 20-21). 
When Richard Nixon took office in 1969, he was faced 
with a 5% i:n:flation rate (J?, p. 21); a disturbing develop-
ment at the time. To slow the rate of inflation, federal 
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policy called for a tightening of credit and higher taxes 
(37, p. 21). After 1969, there was a marked propensity 
toward recession and rising unemployment, in contrast to the 
pattern of the mid-19~0s (8, p. 315; 10, p. 6). This new 
wave of unemployment was a consequence of a change in the 
direction of the national economy. Thus, it was cyclical in 
nature (8, p. 315). Discontent arose as social groups, nor-
mally above the poverty line, became recession victims and 
exerted pressure on the government for assistance. 
In response to an increasingly urgent situation, EEA 
was passed in 19711 authorized at $2.25 billion for two 
years (8, p. 315). President Nixon signed the bill (1, p. 9) 
in spite of his dislike for public employment. Thus, the 
largest public employment program since the Great Depression 
was put into operation (10, p. 60). 
However, EEA was still not enough. It was meant to put 
150,000 people to work and was only authorized for a limited 
time period (8, p. 315). Yet, the economy continued to ex-
hibit an unruly combination of inflation and recession 
("stagflation") into President Nixon's second term, which 
began in January, 1973. The Bureau of Labor Statistics put 
the national jobless rate at 5~ for that year (JJ, p. 486), 
and there were many areas of the country where it was higher. 
For example, Mayor _Joseph Alioto of San Francisco claimed 
that, in certain ghetto neighborhoods, unemployment was be-
tween 20-30% {JJ, p. 78). According to Senator Gaylord 
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Nelson (Democrat-Wi~eonsin), the rate in 1973 for inner 
cities was over 10~ (J8, p. 12079). Kenneth Young, of the 
AFL-CIO, cited 4.2 million unemployed and 7-8 million total 
unemployed and underemployed nationwide, at about the same 
time (J4, p. 127). Compounding the problem was the develop-
ing energy crisis. In the opinion of Congressman Michael J. 
Harrington (Democrat-Massachusetts), that crisis served to 
increase unemployment even more (39, p. J8426). Unemploy-
ment had become a major national issue for the first time in 
at least a decade. 
What did such an economic situation imply for employ-
ment and training reform? The effects of the economic situ-
ation ran along two lineea effects upon the pace of reform, 
and, upon its quality. 
The pace of reform was to be accelerated by the in-
crease in unemployment. Cyclical unemployment, coupled with 
persistent inflation, affected citizens and organizations of 
many different stripes. Local governments needed money to 
get people in their jurisdictions off the streets and into 
training or public service jobs. Anti-poverty organizations 
had to fight for their programs in the midst of greater com-
petition from those recently hit by layoffs, cutbacks and 
closures. Members of Congress could not sit still under the 
circumstances. The rise in unemployment thus served to in-
crease the pressure on Congress to move ahead with some fea-
sible reorganization of employment and training policy. 
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The quality of upcoming reform was to be affected sig-
nificantly by economic conditions. The essential point, in 
this respect, is that cyclical problems preoccupied policy-
makers and structural concerns took a back seat. For one 
thing, public employment remained as popular as ever, despite 
strong conservative sentiment against it. Thus, the stage 
was set for a battle over how far policy should go in ensur-
ing a program like that authorized by EEA. Additionally, 
the method of funding employment and training programs, some-
thing already being questioned by critics of the categorical 
system, would become a subject of debate. Unavoidably, fund 
disbursement would be simplified through the use of a few 
formulae, in which grant monies would be disbursed according 
to factors set by legislation, and on a basis of automatic 
entitlement. This would rationalize a system in which 
grants were made through many separate channels. With un-
employment rising, the number of citizens without work in a 
given area became an important formula factor {JJ, J4). 
Also, given the cyclical nature of that unemployment, con-
flicts over inclusion of structural poverty indicators in 
the formulae were bound to arise. Generally speaking, re-
form was steered in a distributive (as opposed to redistrib-
utive) direction by the economic situation. Budget cutbacks 
became the item of prime concern. For example, Senators 
Claiborne Pell (Democrat-Rhode Island), Edward M. Kennedy 
(Democrat-Massachusetts) and Alan Cranston (Democrat-
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California) joined together in July of 1973 to call for spe-
cial treatment of •areas or States which face unusual unem-
ployment problems because of cutbacks at Government facili-
ties" (40, p. 25713). Senator Pell specifically mentioned 
naval bases in his home state of Rhode Island, which were 
falling victim to government belt-tightening policies aimed 
against inflation (40, p. 25713). Such a concern did not 
indicate a determination to attack poverty based on social 
or economic structure. Finally, the economic pressure which 
accelerated the legislative activity of various groups, com-
bined with political and systemic (i.e., employment and 
training system) factors to raise the probability that re-
form would embody a compromise among the objectives of those 
groups. 
SUMMARY OP THE CONTEXT OF REFORM 
The context of employment and training reform was a 
source of three policy-relevant factors which affected the 
direction in which federal efforts would move. Those fac-
tors werea (a) systemic constraints apparent from both ex-
periences with the programs of the 1960s and pre-CETA reform 
attempts, (b) a political climate characterized by conflict 
between the Nixon Administration and others (notably Con-
gress) plus a lessened faith in the federal government, and 
(c) an economy suffering from "stagflation" and a rising 
unemployment rate. 
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The employment and training system of the 1960s was 
uncoordinated, yet also overly-centralized. Recognition of 
these problems led to thinking about how to improve the sys-
tem in order to make it more efficient and responsive to 
differing geographical conditions. Ideas for improvement 
centered upon the need to consolidate programs, to decentral-
ize authority over them. and to expand the discretion of sub-
national governments with respect to utilization of grant 
funds. 
Pre-CETA attempts to apply these ideas yielded several 
lessons for policymakers and those who would affect employ-
ment and training policy. Chief among those lessons were1 
that prime sponsorships were viable entities, but that they 
must possess the authority, scope and technical capacity ap-
propriate to administering programe1 and that state and local 
general governments were the main candidates for prime spon-
sorships. 
The political climate held implications for reforms 
reform would be accelerated following an initial period of 
stalemate1 reform would shift policy toward decentralization 
and decategorization. 
The condition of the economy, with its rising cyclical 
unemployment, affected reform bys accelerating it1 by en-
suring that public service employment would be a considera-
tion; by raising the question of how grant funds should be 
disburseds and by steering employment and training policy 
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in a more distributive direction relative to earlier policy. 
Finally, the context just described was of such a 
nature that moderation of demands on all sides was required 




The policy environment set the stage for reform, but 
the basic values and beliefs of those involved played an im-
portant role too. Leaving aside common factors (like faith 
in the democratic process) as well as irrelevant factors 
(i.e., ideological elements not bearing directly on the re-
form debate), Chapter VI will focus on the major ideological 
controversies shaping the legislative outcome. Three signif-
icant sets of opposing beliefs were identified as having af-
fected the direction in which employment and training policy 
would move in the late 1960s and early 1970s. They were 
manifested in arguments over the desirability ofa (a) de-
centralization and decategorization, (b) public job-creation, 
and (c) redistribution. 
DECENTRALIZATION/DECATEGORIZATION 
Devolution of power from the federal to subnational 
governments was the fundamental point of ideological conten-
tion. Arguments derived from conflicting beliefs about who 
was better suited for controlling programs--federal bureau-
crats, or persons reporting directly to elected state and 
local officials. A preference for the latter was most 
60 
demonstrably held by the Nixon Administration, many state 
and local officials and conservatives in general. In their 
eyes, the proper place of the federal government was in the 
setting of broad national policy goals and standards. With-
in such broad guidelines, subnational governments should de-
sign and fund programs to fit the labor market and social 
makeup found in their jurisdictions. A preference for cen-
tralization was held most prominently by organized labor, 
representatives of the disadvantaged and liberals in general. 
They felt that consistency of service around the country and 
protection of local minorities re~uired a system which was 
standardized under federal control. The centralists bolster-
ed their argument with evidence of the neglect of poor and 
nonwhite minorities by state and local governments. 
President Nixon himself, reached back to the Founding 
Fathers when putting forth the basis of a belief in decen-
tralization and decategorization. In the process of ex-
plaining the "role of government," he cited the Tenth Con-
stitutional Amendments 
'The powers not delegated to the United States by 
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the 
States, are reserved to the States respectively, or 
to the people'(41, p. 92). 
The President then said1 
The philosophy of the Founding Fathers embodied 
in this amendment is also my philosophy. I be-
lieve that a larger share of our national resourc-
ea must be retained by private citizens and State 
and local governments to enable them to meet their 




Our goal must not be bigger government, but better 
government--at all levels (41, p. 92). 
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In presenting the decentralist philosophy to readers, 
Mirengoff & Rindler explain why a greater subnational reten-
tion of resources is expected to better satisfy local needsa 
The ideological underpinning is the belief that a 
decentralized system is a better expression of pop-
ular will. It was assumed that under [decentrali-
zation/decategorization] there would be greater com-
munity involvement and that local decisionmakers 
would be more closely attuned to the electorate and 
to the clients served (31, p. 4). 
A few pages later, the same authors pin down the mechanism 
through which decentralization and decategorization will 
work1 "Placing the manpower program under the aegis of state 
and local elected officials puts it in the political arena 
and subjects it to the local political process• (Jl, p. 11). 
Thus, by entrusting more control and resources to the 
subnational political process, decentralization and decate-
gorization were expected to enhance the ability of employ-
ment and training programs to reflect the will of the popu-
lace in a given place. By applying this philosophy, pro-
grams which were, in President Nixon's eyes, "'bureaucratic 
[andJ remote from the people they mean to serve,'" and whose 
"'direction does not belong in Federal hands'" (1, pp. 8-9), 
could approach the responsiveness to the electorate so prized 
in a democracy. 
Such a view found solid support during the period of 
employment and training reform. Governor Patrick J. Lucey, 
of Wisconsin, agreed with it, and his opinion exemplified 
the positions of many state and local officialss 
In short, we agree with the President that there is 
a need for a newly defined federalism in America, 
that narrow Federal program requirements frequently 
get in the way of good administrative policy and 
meaningful and effective action at the state and 
local levels ()), p. 51). 
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William c. Woodward, President of the National Alliance of 
Business (NAB), expressed the position of members of the 
business community, with respect to the above principles• 
Existing programs have spread, and grown, and be-
come bureaucratized. In manpower--as in urban re-
newal, housing and many others--there is simply no 
way for a national administration to make the most 
effective decisions. They must be made locally 
(42, p. 4)4). 
The view from the other side of the ideological fence 
was quite different. While praises sung to direct, local 
democracy might have been music to some ears, liberals, labor 
and disadvantaged minorities heard another sound. 
The centralist view applied what might be called "an 
emasculative interpretation of the Tenth amendment" (43, 
p. 376). That is, the centralist position was based upon a 
very narrow perception of that Amendment's reservation of 
powers to state (and, legally, therefore local) governments-
in contradistinction to President Nixon's interpretation. 
Centralist ideology was opposed to the President's assertion 
that employment and training (as well as other programs) do 
"' not belong in Federal hands'" (1, pp. 8-9). After all, 
many of those programs originated in federal hands. As Chase 
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and Ducat state, "The crush of modern day conditions, gener-
ated by industrialism and war, have created conditions of 
nation-wide ••• interdependence," forcing the federal govern-
ment toa 
••• coordinate attacks on problems lying tradition-
ally within the_purview of the states, but which, 
because states Land localities] cannot or will not 
eradicate them, have cumulatively assumed national 
proportions (4J, pp. 374-375). 
From this perspective, a strong central government role was 
required or problems, such as racial discrimination, would 
never be addressed. 
Representatives of disadvantaged minorities were prob-
ably centralism's strongest advocates. Paul J. Smith (33, 
pp. 664-665), of the Inter-Tribal Council of Arizona (a na-
tive American group), wrote a letter to Senator Edward Ken-
nedy in April of 1973. In it, Smith expressed anxiety about 
the consequences of leavi?¥?: native Americans to the care of 
the state of Arizona and its local governments. He based his 
feelings upon negative past experiences with the Arizona gov-
ernment and called for "special legislation~ to protect his 
constituents. Dr. Leon Sullivan (33, pp. 590-595), head of 
Opportunities Industrialization Centers of America (an organ-
ization for training the disadvantaged), cited survey data 
before Congress in May, 1973. The data implied that, of 105 
Centers nationwide, "80 could be wiped out" if control of 
Center funding were transferred to state and local govern-
ments. Dr. Sullivan displayed little confidence that state 
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and local officials would be as helpful to his anti-poverty 
organization as federal officials had been. Concurrence in 
the need for federal control, in an age of interdependence, 
came from the AFL-CIO. That labor organization felt that 
what was needed was a policy to bring "all federally-sup-
ported manpower programs under a federal, centrally consoli-
dated administration in the Department of Labor" (34, p. 
131). 
What did these beliefs, as held by key actors in em-
ployment and training, mean with respect to changes in that 
policy area during the late 1960s and early 1970s? 
Thanks to the strong advocacy of decentralization and 
decategorization by the White House, those ideas were bound 
to be heavily reflected in any reform legislation. Any leg-
islative proposals which smacked of a mere repetition of the 
established centralized system were liable to suffer a Presi-
dential veto. The influence of the White House, in this re-
spect, was further enhanced by a loyal Labor Department. 
The embrace of decentralist ideology by both state and 
local officials and much of the business sector meant that 
the Nixon Administration would have powerful allies. Aside 
from the political clout which such an alliance possessed in 
a general sense, state and local governments and many private 
firms were functionally indispensable to any version of em-
ployment and training system which might obtain. 
Another implication for employment and training policy, 
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evident from the above ideological views, was that elected 
officials of state and local governments would be prime can-
didates for program control responsibilities. This is be-
cause of the importance placed upon the subnational political 
process in decentralist thinking. For believers in that 
process, it seemed the preferred location for deliberation 
of the pros and cons of program alternatives. A corollary 
of this logical element was the notion of community partici-
pation-- grass-roots input from a plurality of local organi-
zations. This concept, with its connotation of popular de-
mocracy, was acclaimed during the 1960s and continued to be 
praised in decentralist thinking. 
Despite the power of belief in a decentralized system, 
centralist ideology remained strong among many actors carry-
ing weight in employment and training affairs. It is clear, 
from the literature and records of policy debates, that be-
lief in the federal capacity to satisfy needs was still po-
tent among Congressional Democrats, ethnic minorities, the 
poverty community and labor unions (JJ, 34). Congressional 
resistance to all-out decentralization was thus assured. 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT 
The creation of jobs in the public sector, as a remedy 
for rising unemployment, was a second focal point of ideo-
logical dispute. The Nixon Administration and conservatives 
were opposed to programs for expanding the rolls of public 
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service workers. Such a policy approach has always been ana-
thema to staunch defenders of private enterprise. Most Con-
gressional Democrats and liberals were in favor of increased 
government hiring, because they perceived it as a more tan-
gible prescription for treating unemployment than waiting for 
a revived private sector to absorb large numbers of the un-
employed. 
The reasoning behind the-conservative distaste for pub-
lic employment was expounded by economist Milton Friedman 
(44, p. 59). Although the following argument was published 
shortly after the enactment of CETA, the issue was the same 
one as before enactment. To Friedman, and others opposed to 
public employment, the appeal of hiring more people on tax-
payers' money was •spurious," because the "indirect" costs 
of such programs were likely to outweigh the immediate bene-
fits. He raised the question of where funds to pay for pub-
lic jobs would come from. Friedman considered available an-
swers to that question unsatisfactory. For example, cutting 
government spending in one substantive area, to finance new 
public employment in another area, was expected to cause lay-
offs in the first area--plus, as Friedman saw it, "very like-
ly a loss in efficiency." Another common answer to the above 
question was that the newly created positions could be paid 
for out of revenues raised from tax increases. However, such 
a solution was frowned upon by Friedman because he felt that 
tax increases only hindered the capacity of the private 
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sector to hire people. In that case, "New government em-
ployees would simply replace persons employed in the private 
sector. 'Make-work' would replace private employment that 
met demands of taxpayers." Friedman continued, dismissing 
the possibilities of funding public employment through "bor-
rowing from the public," or "printing or creating new money." 
He envisioned problems with the borrowing option because 
"less credit would be available to lend to others." More 
public borrowing would also mean that "Make-work would re-
place employment devoted to adding to our productive wealth." 
Friedman completed his criticism by pointing out that in-
creasing the money supply, to pay for new government jobs, 
would be "inflationary and so would undo with the left hand 
what the right hand was striving to achieve--namely, less 
inflation." Recall that, early in the first Nixon Admini-
stration, federal policy prescribed a tightening of credit 
in order to fight inflation, and this was followed by em-
ployee layoffs (37, p. 21; 8, p. 315). Turning to a pre-
scription of what to do, given such an economic quandary, 
Friedman suggested easing up on anti-inflation measures and 
"improving our system of welfare and of insurance against 
long-term unemployment." 
Thomas P. Walsh, of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce (J4, 
pp. 186-189), expressed a more moderate opinion on public 
hiring, yet one which nevertheless revealed a dislike for 
such an approach. He could have accepted a program providing 
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temporary jobs, with clients tightly restricted to those un-
employed the longest, and on the condition that •these jobs 
should avoid competing directly with business for workers." 
Walsh asserted the superiority of the private sector in em-
ployment and training affairs. As evidence for this, he 
pointed out that four out of five members of the work force 
were privately employed. As further evidence, he cited the 
success of the National Alliance of Business/Job Opportuni-
ties in the Business Sector (NAB/JOBS) program* in channel-
ing over a million disadvantaged youth into employment. In 
Walsh's estimation, since business was "best informed on the 
number and types of current and prospective jobs," neglect-
ing "to take advantage of the experience and perspective [of] 
business could result in unrealistic and wasteful manpower 
training programs." 
Advocates of public employment saw matters in an en- . 
tirely different light. They brought up the Employment Act 
of 1946 as proof of federal acceptance of responsibility for 
reducing joblessness, and countered the above arguments with 
respect to the social and economic viability of public hiring. 
Congressman Henry s. Reuss (Democrat-Wisconsin) (39, 
pp. J8422-J8423) supported public employment as a remedy for 
recession-induced layoffs, for four reasons. First, he re-
*a federal categorical program, begun in 1968, in 
which poor clients were trained by businesses (JO, p. 571 45, 
p. 114). 
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ferred to federal responsibility under the Employment Act. 
Secondly, he considered public employment to be the most di-
rect way to put people to work. Third, Reuss did not believe 
that public employment caused inflationary problems. Rather, 
inflation was fed by shortages in the economy, including 
shortages of labor. Finally, the Congressman thought that 
public hiring would help to avoid a bigger recession, because 
certain economists estimated such hiring would yield more 
jobs in the private sector. He cited professional opinion 
to the effect that• for every public job created, two addi-
tional private ones would result. Not content with defending 
public employment, Reuss attacked the view which called for 
policies aimed at macroeconomic expansion--to wait for bene-
fits to (as Reuss saw it) "trickle down." That approach re-
quired too high a consumption of fuel and raw materials for 
the Representative from Wisconsin. 
Others agreed with Congressman Reuss. Kenneth Young, 
of the AFL-CIO (34, p. 131), also referred to the Employment 
Act, and offered the labor federation's own interpretation 
of federal responsibility. According to that interpretation, 
when the 11 regular" workings of the economy failed, federal 
responsibility consisted of funding a "large-scale public-
service employment program," because training without jobs 
waiting for trainees was nonsensical. Mayor Patricia 
Sheehan, of New Brunswick, New Jersey (33, p. 124), sided 
with Congressman Reuss, stating that "many economists" 
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believed that public employment was the "least inflationary• 
way to expand employment and could help alleviate the "des-
perate shortage of public goods and services which cities 
face.N 
The arguments over public employment were based upon 
expert analytical estimates--more so than the other ideolog-
ical disputes generated during reform proceedings. In try-
ing to convince constituents of the desirability (or undesir-
ability) of public employment, the leading political forces 
on either side prepared their evidence carefully. Between 
them, business leaders and the Nixon Administration consti-
tuted a potent coalition on this issue. Opponents of pub-
lic employment argued for the anti-public employment faith 
by emphasizing the detrimental consequences they anticipated 
from an expansion of government hiring. They would endeavor 
to construct a scenario of increased inflation, taxation, 
corruption and waste, as well as lowered productivity--all 
coming on top of an already unhealthy economic condition. 
On the other hand, labor, state and local governments and 
most Congressional Democrats would stress that "stagflation• 
could be treated with the assistance of public employment. 
They would also point out that, with EEA expiring in 1973, 
the chance to extend that assistance should not be passed up. 
The public employment programs of EEA had been popular 
(JJ, J4, 39, 40). Unemployed clients who benefited from that 
Act greatly appreciated being offered jobs, although temporary 
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ones, in public service. Accordingly, the members of Con-
gress and state and local politicians who presented constit-
uents with such benefits accrued political merits. Thus, 
once EEA was on the scene, and given the condition of the 
economy, public employment seemed assured of continuation. 
The only questions left, by 1973, were those dealing with the 
scope and duration of a new public employment program. 
The range of answers to these questions was sizeable. 
At one extreme were liberals like Senator Walter Mondale 
(Democrat-Minnesota) (33, p. 1)4) who felt that much of the 
discourse on public employment was blind to the important 
point. While others argued over fractional changes in fund-
ing, Senator Mondale's opinion was1 "As a matter of fact, I 
think we ought to determine whether the program should be 
doubled, tripled, or quadrupled." At the other extreme, were 
public employment critics, like Nixon Administration offi-
cials, who wanted no part of a mandatory or permanent pro-
gram. They wished to leave this kind of program as one of 
several options available at the discretion of prime spon-
sors (JO, p. 55). In step with the White House, DOL (JO, p. 
56) had proposed that only areas suffering unemployment of 8% 
or higher should be eligible for public jobs money, when 
other such proposals were generally in the range of 6-7% (JJ, 
J4, 39. 40). 
Employment and training reform would not occur without 
a resolution of the public employment question. Some exten-
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sion of government hiring, similar to EEA, was unavoidable. 
That the program would be significant in size. (i.e., ap-
proaching EEA) was clear, judging from the condition of the 
economy and public employment's political appeal. Yet, just 
how far Congress would go in guaranteeing such a program re-
mained unclear. 
REDISTRIBUTION 
Ripley & Franklin (9, p. 21) define distributive 1policy 
as •aimed at promoting private activities that are said to 
be desirable to society as a whole and, at least in theory, 
would not or could not be undertaken otherwise." Elaborat-
ing upon the concept, those authors state that distributive 
policies yield "subsidies," which are spread around in such 
a manner that "there appear to be only winners and no 
losers." In other words, a sense of competition between 
those subsidized is lacking. Figuratively, they character-
ize distributive policies as those which "embody the federal 
pork barrel in its fullest sense.• In contrast, the same 
authors define redistributive policy ass 
••• intended to manipulate the allocation of wealth, 
property rights, or some other value among social 
classes or racial groups in society. The redis-
tributive feature enters because a number of actors 
perceive there are 'winners' and 'losers' in poli-
cies and that policies transfer some value from one 
group at the expense of another group (9, p. 25). 
Ripley and Franklin (9, p. 25) then explain that the term 
redistributive takes its special political meaning when the 
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direction of value reallocation is from the relatively well-
off to the relatively disadvantaged. Such a reallocation of 
value usually generates controversy, based upon philosophi-
cal differences. 
The rationale for redistribution, as put forth by mod-
ern American liberals, is based upon a conceptualization of 
the role of the federal government as an agency to be used 
for alleviating social inequality. This view has been ex-
pressed consistently by prominent policymakers. For example, 
Supreme Court decisions during the Great Depression (which 
served as precedents for later.decades) took this view, enun-
ciating a broad interpretation of federal powers in upholding 
the r~ghts of workers to organize and of elderly citizens to 
enjoy financial security (J, p. 69). Several decades later, 
the same belief was evident in the federal Economic Develop-
ment Administration (EDA), whose representative in Oakland, 
California, Amory Bradford, saw that agency's job program far 
ghetto residents as an appropriate method in dealing with 
inner-city social problems (7, p. J). 
Opponents of redistributive policies have held that 
such policies allow too much federal intervention in private 
and subnational affairs and foster corruption and administra-
tive red tape as well. Such a view was expressed during the 
1930s, in opposition to policy pronouncements like the Court 
decisions just mentioned. At that time, a reaction to such 
redistributive policies took place, in whicha 
Political conservatives in both parties, business 
groups, and financiers as well as former president 
Hoover, joined in a defense of limited constitu-
tional government, the sovereignty of the states, 
and the free-market economy (J, pp. 68-69). 
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Ripley and Franklin (14, pp. 160-18,), have summarized the 
complaints of contemporary critics of federal redistributive 
efforts. To the critics, redistributive programs have been 
seen as "'external interventions into local systems,'" based 
on "bureaucratic imperatives" and conducive to "fraud and 
abuse." During employment and training reform proceedings, 
such convictions (as well as those favorable to redistribu-
tion) were in evidence, as the proper emphasis of a new bill 
was debated. 
Representatives of anti-poverty organizations felt the 
political tide turning against them as forces calling for de-
centralization, decategorization and consolidation gained mo-
mentum. Community-based organizations (CBOs)--national asso-
ciations with local chapters, engaged in redistributive ef-
forts--were worried about losing the government contracts 
they had enjoyed under 1960s' legislation. They perceived 
"in the trend toward consolidation a threat to their separate 
identity and to the rationale for having separate organiza-
tions to deal with specific client groups" (31, pp 112-115). 
Republican Senator Jacob Javits (New York) was an outspoken 
defender of a redistributive emphasis. The Senator's posi-
tion was illustrated by a proposal he made to Congress, in 
July of 1973 aimed at protecting anti-poverty programs 
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established in the 1960s. Javits wished to retain, for DOL, 
the power tos 
••• turn a program off ••• [in case] it fails to give 
'due consideration to continued funding of programs 
of demonstrated effectiveness' for manpower train-
ing under the Manpower Development and Training Act 
or the Economic Opportunity Act (40, p. 25712). 
Those opposed to required tunning of anti-poverty or-
ganizations ~referred to see special consideration for target 
groups removed from legislative proposals. William Kolberg, 
Assistant Secretary of Labor, was unequivocal about that. 
Kolberg told members of Congress that the Administration's 
preference was fora 
••• no presumptive deliverers of service, although 
we do expect that nearly all [subnational] offi-
cials will choose to utilize the services of es-
tablished and experienced agencies ••• when their 
local plans include activities traditionally asso-
ciated with those agencies (JJ, p. 281). 
The Assistant Secretary did not say what might become of es-
tablished providers, in case local plans did not include ac-
tivities traditionally associated with those agencies. Kol-
berg continued with Administration logic (JJ, p. 282) object-
ing to Senate proposals to mandate services to persons of 
limited English-speaking ability and the elderly, saying that 
such proposals represented a "step away from the complete de-
categorization favored by the Administration ... Thomas P. 
Walsh, of the u.s. Chamber of Commerce ()4, p. 189), voiced 
opposition to a House proposal for guaranteeing that CBOs 
and other organizations serving special client groups 
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participate in developing prime sponsor plans. To Walsh, 
that notion was too categorical. He felt that the word 
"''target•• in the House proposal• s language was improper. 
Walsh preferred reform legislation to "provide an apportuni-
ty for participation by a broad spectrum of interests, in-
cluding business and labor as well as government and minor-
ity groups." 
Disputes over the method of disbursement of employment 
and training funds were particularly relevant to the ques-
tion of redistribution. Reformers wanted to simplify the 
various funding procedures, of the programs up for consoli-
dation, into just a few formulae. The new formulae would be 
based upon measures of the relative need of recipient juris-
dictions (e.g., a state or county's proportion of the total 
of unemployed persons), with recipients being automatically 
entitled to money by virtue of being prime sponsors. Prior 
to reform, many employment and training progrms had been fund-
ed on an individual project basis, while others were formula 
funded. Under project funding, "not all eligible areas need 
receive shares, and these shares need not be equal ••• unlike 
formula grants, they can be molded to fit the recipients' 
peculiar problems .. (47, p. 270). Project funding also dele-
gates "considerable discretion to middle-level federal grants' 
administrators, including the power to decide what units ••• 
[qualify] in the competition for project awards" (J, p. 103). 
The established combination of funding methods led many to · 
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complain of unfairness to certain parts of the country-, and 
certain constituencies, which were left out in the cold, not 
to mention the~'Pf'..O.blem -Ofv.administrati ve complexity. Yet, 
as attractive as reform proposals may have seemed to innocent 
observers, proponents of redistribution felt that reformist 
plans would pull the rug out from under poverty constituents, 
who had been favored by 1960s' arrangements. Unfortunately 
for the latter, reform cries for consolidation, simplifica-
tion and reduction of federal bureaucratic discretion, were 
louder than voices def ending the existing system. Some ex-
amples of formula disputes will serve to illustrate the re-
lationship between funding options and a redistributive ap-
proach. 
One of the few differences between the two chambers of 
Congress (perhaps the most significant), in writing compre-
hensive legislation in 1973. was that between the funding 
formulae they presented. The House version called for dis-
tributing money for "c.omprehensive manpower services" (i.e •• 
the basic grant to subnationals) on the basis of •the rela~ 
tive number of unemployed" in a prime sponsorship or program 
area, as well as the "previous year's allotment of manpower 
funds" for that area. The Senate wanted this formula based 
on "the relative number of unemployed and of adults with an 
annual income below the Bureau of Labor Statistics' lower 
living standard budget" (1, p. lJ). While this example risks 
oversimplifying th~ nature of these proposals, it is clear 
that the Senate version was taking a more redistributive 
path. 
78 
A little later in the aame year, the House was consid-
ering a new basic grant formula which incorporated• (a) the 
relative number of unemplQyed, (b) the relative size of an 
area's work force, and (c) the previous year's allotment ()4, 
p. lJO). The AFL-CIO and a segment of city officials felt 
that inclusion of the work force factor would result in a 
pork-barrel distribution of benefits. Accordingly, those 
actors proposed alternative formulae, incorporating adult pov-
erty in place of work force size (J4, pp. 48-491 J4, p. lJO). 
One final example shows the magnitude of the distrib-
utive-redistributive question, a question which was often 
hidden, but nevertheless present. The National Association 
of Counties (NACO) was pushing for a shift of programs and 
funding emphasis toward non-urban areas, complaining that the 
1960s' big city approach was ignoring the vast needy popula-
tion in suburbs and rural places (J,, p. 151). NACO backed 
the House formula just mentioned (with unemployment, work 
force and prior year's allotment) (J4, p. 67)--the same one 
which labor and some mayors thought would be too distribu-
tive. Apparently, the counties felt they would fare better 
under that arrangement. While not openly criticizing redis-
tribution, MACO was backing a formula which veterans of the 
War on Poverty saw as too broad in its spreading of benefits. 
It appeared that the 1960s' redistributive approach 
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would be altered in favor of a wider distribution of services 
and jobs. Funding revision was in the offing, and no formu-
la proposals called for a predominance of poverty factors 
over other factors (e.g., previous funding). An area's rela-
tive number of unemployed could be an indicator of recession 
damage as much as of structural poverty. While defenders of 
categorical targeting tried offering formula proposals which 
would stress redistribution, they remained anxious about the 
idea of destroying the network of separate project grants. 
Ripley & Franklin sum up the reason for that anxiety1 
The choices about who gets what at the expense of 
whom (the essence of a redistributive program) are 
fuzzed over by the use of a formula to allocate 
funds and by the stress on local control ••• Given 
the absence of a national mandate to emphasize re-
distributive benefits, and the inexperience and/or 
unwillingness of city and county [or state?] govern-
ments to engage in redistributive activity, [decen-
tralized, decategorized] programs will get defined 
and implemented as distributive programs, and the 
conflicts that arise will focus on questions of 
jurisdiction and dollar allocations to geographical-
ly defined units rather than on who benefits to what 
effect in a broader social sense (9, p. 173). 
Cate~orical targeting on the disadvantaged no longer enjoyed 
the support it once had, and was being attacked by the Admin-
istration, state and local governments and business1 charged 
with responsibility for many of the ills of the system. 
However, proponents of a redistributive approach were 
not political weaklings, and many organizations on that side 
of the ideological fence were fighting for their survival. 
Groups like the AFL-CIO, or large community-based organiza-
tions, maintained significant influence on Capitol Hill and 
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in parts of the federal bureaucracy. These groups were also 
of importance to the stable functioning of much of the employ-
ment and training system--being experienced program opera-
tors. They had little choice under the circumstances, but to 
accept pending changes. However, given the place of these 
actors in the system, and in American society as representa-
tives of large segments of the population, their calls for 
some retention of targeting and "'programs of demonstrated 
effectiveness•• (40, p. 25712) could not go entirely unheed-
ed in Congress. 
SUMMARY OF IDEOLOGICAL FACTORS 
The three outstanding ideological disputes during re-
form proceedings occurred overs (a) decentralization/decat-
egorization, (b) public service employment, and (c) redis-
tribution. 
The Nixon Administration, prominent members of the 
business community and the bulk of state and local officials 
favored decentralization of program control to subnational 
governments, as well as elimination of federal restrictions 
on fund utilization by subnationals (decategorization). 
They based this position upon a belief in the subnational 
political process as a better arbiter of differences over 
the nature of programs. In their view, federal officials 
were out of touch with regional, state and local conditions, 
and were best suited for setting broad national goals, while 
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leaving the means of implementing those goals essentially up 
to states and localities. 
Opposed to such thinking, were those believing in a re-
tention of a strong federal role in program design and imple-
mentation. Some members of Congress, poverty community groups 
and many unions took this view--which was derived from ob-
serving an interconnection between different areas of the 
country and concluding that strong central coordination was 
needed. The often poor track record of states and local gov-
ernments in areas of social policy seemed to verify the ne-
cessity of centralization for these groups. 
The embrace of decentralization and decategorization 
by many in government, at all levels, plus the private sec-
tor, meant that significant changes along those lines were 
imminent. Yet, minority groups, many members of Congress 
and others were not about to allow the decentralizing trend 
to go too far. Thus, employment and training policy had to 
incorporate some new philosophical principles, while trying 
to avoid possible chaos in the delivery system due to the 
profundity of applying the new principles. 
Opponents of public employment cited many undesirable 
social and economic consequences which could be expected 
from such a program, as a remedy for cyclical unemployment. 
Yet, proponents countered with logic of their own, even 
clai~ing that public employment would be healthy for the 
economy. Given the wide support which public employment 
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programs of the Emergency Employment Act received, as well 
as the state of the economy, such programs seemed assured 
of continuation. However, those looking at public employ-
ment in an essentially negative light were highly influen-
tial, and would do their best to keep such a program from 
mushrooming into a limitless spending spree at the taxpay-
er's expense. 
The extent to which employment and training policy 
should target on the disadvantaged, as so much of it did in 
the 1960s, also divided participants in an ideological way. 
Many groups favored an implicitly more distributive approach 
because of their perception of Great Society categorization 
as unfair in terms of geographical disbursement of benefits. 
Prevailing discontent with the heavy hand of Washington 
assured a rough road for anti-poverty warriors--a distinctly 
different circumstance from the experience of the 1960s. 
C.HAPTER VII 
OBJECTIVES 
The ideological factors above were based upon actors' 
philosophical persuasions. In this part, the concrete ob-
jectives of actors, as well as the significance of those 
objectives for the development of reform, will be examined. 
The organizational format for this part was devised upon 
recognition of several distinct groupings of objectives 
among those with a stake in federal employment and training 
policy. Some of those groupings include the objectives of 
only a single organizational unit or interest group. Other 
groupings include the objectives of several organizational 
units because of a close similarity between the ends sought 
by those organizations. The purpose of this part of the 
thesis is to round out the analysis of factors affecting re-
form, by complementing the parts on context and ideology. 
NIXON ADMINISTRATION 
The essential objective of the Administration in em-
ployment and training reform was in trying to make that sub-
stantive area a showcase for President Nixon's •special rev-
enue sharing" model of intergovernmental fiscal relation-
ships (41, p. 93). Reagan and Sanzone (6, p. 128) define 
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special revenue sharing (SRS) in terms of a closely related 
Nixon model called General Revenue Sharing {GRS). According 
to those authors (6, p. 82), GRS was "based on transferring 
federal revenue to subnational governments with as few feder-
al guidelines (strings) as possible," and was meant to re-
duce federal interference in subnational decision-making so 
that officials of the latter governments could "decide on 
their~ priorities, goals, and funding levels for specific 
programs." The same authors (6, p. 82) consider the ele-
ments of GRS to be "quite a departure from the conditional 
categorical grant programs of the 1960s," and think those 
elements were "rightfully dubbed a 'New Federalism'." They 
define GRS as aa 
••• new model in that it is a hybrid of cooperative 
f ederalism--the federal government fiscally assist-
ing subnational governments to achieve their own 
objectives--and dual federalism--the ideological 
jargon of states' rights and local control {6, p. 
82). 
To Reagan and Sanzonea 
••• special revenue sharing would be just like its 
'big brother' GRSa a way of transferring funds 
from the national to the local [or state] level 
without further federal decision making, except 
that SRS would specify a broad area within which 
the recipient government must use the funds, such 
as community development, law enforcement, education, 
or manpower training (6, p. 128). 
Of utmost importance was the fact that SRS recipients would 
not have to apply for federal money--they would be entitled 
to a formula amount, based upon demographic and other data--
and "there would be no granting-agency approval [of sub-
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national plans] required" (6, p. 128). 
Melvin B. Mogulof (46) also wrote on SRS. According 
to Mogulof, the intent of SRS is the consolidation of grants 
while leaving a few federal strings attached. The role of 
the federal government in such a relationship would basic-
ally be limited to ensuring that broad national goals are 
being met and the law is being obeyed. The gathering and 
dissemination of information, the provision of technical as-
sistance to states and localities and research and develop-
ment would occupy federal bureaucrats--but not decisions re-
garding subnational program characteristics. Also, the 
matching requirements so typical of categoricals would be 
eliminated under SRS. Those requirements called for a recip-
ient to invest a quantity of its own revenue in certain ac-
tivities--that quantity being determined as a proportion of 
the federal investment in those activities. SRS was to re-
place matching requirements with "maintenance of effort" 
responsibilities for subnationals to meet; whereby the lat-
ter would simply be obligated to sustain the same level of 
~~~- ~~ ~~-
funding in a substantive area. In Mogulof's words (46, p. 
30), "Total decategorization" of a policy area would be "the 
best initial step" in realizing SRS. 
President Nixon declared his Administration's objec-
tives for four substantive areas, including employment and 
training a 
••• I remain convinced that the principle of special 
revenue sharing is essential to continued revitali-
zation of the federal system. I am therefore pro-
posing the creation of special revenue sharing pro-
grams in the 1974 budget. 
These four programs consist of broad-purpose 
grants, which will provide State and local govern-
ments with $6.9 billion to use with considerable 
discretion in the areas of education, law enforce-
ment and criminal justice, manpower training, and 
urban community development. They will replace 70 
outmoded, narrower categorical grant programs and 
will, in most cases, eliminate matching require-
ments (41, p. 93). 
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With respect to the "manpower training" area, the Ad-
ministration tried to adhere to the SRS model whenever it was 
necessary to state a position. Even in the atmosphere of com-
promise in 1973, DOL continued to fight for the SRS model. 
For example, despite the Administration's private sector sup-
port, Assistant Secretary Kolberg (33, p. 282) told members 
of Congress that •we are opposed to any implication of writ-
ing the categorical [National Alliance of Business] JOBS con-
tract program into permanent law.• The key word in this 
quote is categorical. Such a stance, against any categori-
cal tainting of SRS, was taken by the Administration con-
sistently during legislative hearings in 1973, and the dis-
cretion of state and local governments was spoken of as 
being as sacrosanct as the notion of presumptive providers 
was sinful (33, 34). Perhaps the most indicative evidence 
of the Administration's adherence to the SRS plan was Kol-
berg's statement (J4, p. 81) to the effect that federal ap-
proval of grants should be based upon prime sponsors' own 
certifications that their programs meet national require-
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ments. That opinion was expressed to members of Congress 
only a few months before CETA was enacted, and illustrated 
the Administration's tenacity, right up until the end of re-
form proceedings. 
The objectives of the Nixon Administration for employ-
ment and training were extremely important to the direction 
to be taken by reform. The weight carried by the Administra-
tion and allies, in pushing for decentralization, decategor-
ization and consolidation, has already been discussed in 
this paper. However, aside from those reasons, the SRS 
scheme was significant for employment and training reform 
for another critical reason. SRS served as the yardstick 
against which the objectives of virtually all other actors 
were compared. While other forces pushed for changes in, or 
retnetion of, certain elements of the status quo, only the 
Administration proffered a complete plan for systemic re-
form. The Administration took the initiative, and others 
reacted. Most of the discourse on employment and training 
reform in the early 1970s, regardless of the terms in which 
it was expressed, amounted to different degrees of accept-
ance, rejection, or adjustment of the SRS framework. 
STATES 
The National Governors' Conference made no pretense at 
apologizing for the status quo in employment and training. 
State chief executives had felt left out by the programs of 
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the 1960s, and were ready, willing and able to obtain a new 
piece of the grant-in-aid action. 
Essentially agreeing with the Nixon Administration's 
reform plans (as long as those plans were carried out upon 
le~islative authorization), the Governors focused upon one 
major concern. That was, that reform should avoid handing 
too much authority over to cities and counties, leaving 
states to pick up the odd responsibilities lying outside the 
spheres of the former. A largely federal-local connection 
was just what the Governors had to prevent, or else employ-
ment and training revenue sharing would be, in their view, 
unworkable (33, pp. 50-71). 
State governments accepted the probability of playing 
a sort of clean-up role--acting as stewards for areas within 
states which lay outside the jurisdictions of populous cities 
and counties ( 33, 34). These were the so-called "'balance-of-
state" areas (1, p. 14). However, the Governors were eager 
to play a bigger part, namely, that of central coordinator 
of federally-financed employment and training activities in 
a state. Governor Francis w. Sargent, of Massachusetts (33, 
pp. 52-53), thought "the States must be allowed to play the 
major role in setting manpower priorities," because giving 
too much power to substate officials would be wasteful and 
inefficient. Agreeing with ~argent was Governor Calvin L~ 
Rampton, of Utah (33, pp. 54-55), who saw "'political frag-
mentation" replacing categorical fragmentation, if local 
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governments were not coordinated through a single state plan. 
Rampton felt a long-run consequence of excessive local con-
trol would be a renewal of calls for federal intervention to 
restore order. Rampton specified the need for state govern-
ments to control the distribution of resources to substate 
units, and not just act as a pass-through station, because 
control of money was indispensable for elected officials to 
be "heard." The Utah Governor did acknowledge that the lo-
cals were "equally important, if not more important," in 
delivering services. 
Another concern of the states was the method of dis-
bursement of federal employment and training funds around 
the country. William R. Bechtel, executive director of the 
Wisconsin State Manpower Council (33, p. 71), asserted that 
one of the thornier problems states had in this policy area 
was the unstable, unpredictable fashion in which federal re-
gional offices provided funds. Bechtel complained that Wis-
consin had recently suffered three different regional ad-
ministrators for employment and training in a single year. 
Each administrator altered the funding pattern, leaving Wis-
consin officials unable to plan for the future. For reasons 
like this, state officials looked for a revision of the fund-
ing method along the lines of the simplification into a few 
formulae mentioned earlier in this paper (33, 34). 
The strong desire by state officials to take on new 
responsibilities, led to their basic alignment with the 
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Nixon Administration, at least in terms of the latter's pref-
erences for restructuring the employment and training system. 
That, plus dissatisfaction with existing funding methods, 
implied that the reform movement had acquired some very in-
fluential members in the form of state officials. 
The determination of state officials, combined with 
their increasing functional importance, meant that states 
would undoubtedly play a larger role in employment and train-
ing than in the 1960s. State governments had developed their 
planning and administrative capacities to a significant ex-
tent by the early 1970s. Yet, even before that, much of the 
delivery system was dependent upon such entities as public 
schools or the federal-state employment service. Those en-
tities were connected in various ways to state governments 
(e.g., through a state education department), and such con-
nections already implied some responsibility (even if indi-
rect) for employment and training, on the part of state gov-
ernments. Thus, the popularity of decentralization, the re-
cently acquired state capacity for joining in implementation 
and the continuation of that part of the old system {reform 
was not to cover the whole system) whereby state officials 
were already involved, implied a larger state role for the 
future. 
CITIES 
City governments represented by the National League 
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of Cities-u.s. Conference of Mayors (NLC-USCM) agreed with 
decentralization, decategorization and consolidation, and, 
like the states, appeared eager for a larger share of pro-
gram responsibility. Yet, the cities emphasized certain 
items which were of special importance to them. In one re-
spect, namely the mayors' call for autonomy in the designing 
and running of programs, cities were declaring themselves to 
be in open competition with the states and populous counties. 
Mayor Stanley A. Cmich, of Canton, Ohio (JJ, pp. 76-77) 
an officer of the NLC-USCM, provided a convincing argument 
for what he called a •bottoms-up• approach to implementation. 
Cmich felt it was "ill-conceived to think that an effective 
system of planning and operations can be developed from the 
top down." In his view, the real diversities found between 
cities would be ignored by state (or federal) officials. 
Cmich complained about an idea put forth by the Governor of 
Ohio, which would have created state planning districts, one 
of which would have combined Cleveland, Akron and Canton in 
the same district. That, according to Cmich, was absurd, 
given the differences between those cities. He held that re-
form should authorize formation of "logical planning dis-
tricts," to be determined by the "individual metropolitan 
core cities and other jurisdictions." That would best be 
achieved through_ "direct funding to the cities," in the may-
or's opinion. Mayor Russell Davis, of Jackson, Mississippi, 
also with NLC-USCM ()3, pp. 104-107), concurred with Crnich, 
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demanding that local elected officials be allowed to "deter-
mine prime sponsorship within their jurisdiction," and that 
"locally determined programs and priorities would be pre-
sumptive." 
Such opinions were mainly directed against state im-
positions. Yet, many city governments were apparently wor-
ried about being subsumed under county authority as well. 
Steve Cappiello, mayor of Hoboken, N. J. (34, pp. 4)-46), 
felt there were a number of smaller cities which, if included 
under a county or state sponsorship, would remain underserved. 
Specifically, Cappiello asked that the Secretary of Labor be 
permitted to designate "smaller metropolitan cities" as prime 
sponsorships, "when special and severe manpower problems ex-
ist in [those cities, and when they have] the demonstrated 
capacity to plan and operate manpower programs.• John Gun-
ther, executive director of the USCM (34, pp. 47-54), agreed 
with this. Cappiello (34, pp. 45-46) also proposed that 
smaller cities be enabled to join together in consortia, 
which would then act as separate prime sponsorships. Culhane 
(JO, p. 58) reports that city officials supported a proposal 
requiri~ counties to have a minimum population of 150,000 
to be prime sponsors (as opposed to another proposal of 
100,000). ·rhe former requirements would have the effect of 
reducing the number of county sponsorships. 
Two other points, generally emphasized by city offi-
cials, were the need for public employment and the need to 
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maintain past levels of funding within local jurisdictions. 
The position of most mayors on public employment was exem-
plified by Mayor Sheehan, of New Brunswick, N.J. {JJ, p. 124), 
who spoke of the •desperate• need cities had for EEA-style 
programs. Joseph Alioto, mayor of San Francisco {JJ, p. 80), 
said that EEA jobs were •at the heart of the city's public 
service.• The majority of city officials whose views were 
discovered by this author felt as Alioto and Sheehan did on 
public employment. Likewise, the need for an adequate •hold-
harmless" clause, in any new bill, was widely cited by city 
officials {JJ, J4). Such a clause would be intended to 
guaranty continuation of a certain percentage of previous 
funding for a given jurisdiction. John Gunther {J4, p. SO) 
told members of Congress that he was concerned about "dis-
ruptions• of decade-long patterns of service and wanted a 
•percentage 'floor•• (e.g., 95~ of the previous year's as-
sistance) mandated, in order to prevent such disruptions. 
Undoubtedly, city governments were anxious about the new 
policy trend in which the 1960s' urban emphasis seemed to be 
losing support. 
One issue around which cities did not unite was that 
of the basic grant formula for fund disbursement. In ac-
cordance with their concern over maintenance of previous 
funding levels, city officials supported a formula which 
would meet that concern (1, p. 14). Yet, beyond that, unity 
among cities on formula factors was lacking. The Culhane 
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( '.30, ~p. 58) article reveals that the mayors' organizations 
did not press Congress for a particular formula, because 
there was too much of a divergence of interests among cities 
to allow them to close ranks behind any of the available pro-
posals. By way of example, Mayor Richard Hatcher, of Gary, 
Indiana ()3, p. 108), felt that the relative number of un-
employed in an area should be the "principal factor,• while 
John Gunther (34, pp. 47-54) thought only two factors should 
be used--the relative number of unemployed, and, the a11ount 
of adult poverty. Gunther dismissed inclusion of the pro-
portion of the total labor force in an area, because it 
would allocate funds to "suburban and more affluent juris-
diction at the expense of central cities and counties.where 
unemployment and poverty are the greatest.• 
The city stance in favor of a highly localietic, high-
ly decentralized system held some mixed implications for em-
ployment and training policy. Calling for a "bottoms-up" 
approach meant that, to the extent that legislation reflected 
that call, the local political process would be enhanced as 
a forum for shaping programs. Programs might then be expect-
ed to incorporate both 1960s' and new wave qualities, depend-
ing upon the particular locality in which they were devel-
oped. Given the sympathy which localistic values enjoyed at 
the time, a •bottoms-up" system would be a realistic possi-
bility. In cities where anti-poverty organizations already 
possessed close ties to city politicians, 1960s' quality 
9S 
programs could be expected to continue. On the other hand, 
in places where other service providing organizations had 
the ear of city hall, programs would more likely take on a 
different (less redistributive?) quality. 
The preference of city officials for "hold-harm.less• 
provisions (whether in, or separate from, the basic grant 
formula), if realized in law, would be expected to supple-
ment the above implications. Where anti-poverty groups were 
already established and friendly with city governments, main-
tenance of past funding levels would surely serve to perpet-
uate that situation. On the other hand, in communities with 
a different set or political accomodations, a quite differ-
ent status quo could just as easily be perpetuated by •hold-
harmless" provisions. 
Two other points of signi!icance for reform are evi-
dent from the stated objectives of city officials. First, 
the tenacity with which those officials defended city terri-
tory--citing the political, administrative and social im-
portance or their governmental units--implied that the poli-
cy road leading away from the 1960s' urban focus would surely 
be littered with obstacles placed there by city forces. Sec-
ondly, city governments constituted one or public employ-
ment's most crucial sources of political support. In coali-
tion with groups, such as labor, city governments would help 
to perpetuate that program, and to reap the fiscal, political 
and perhaps social benefits associated therewith. 
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COUN'l'IES 
~here was some similarity between the interests of 
county governments and those of the cities, both being units 
of general local government. Nevertheless, counties were in 
competition for a greater share of responsibility in imple-
mentation. Thus, while county officials concurred with their 
local government cousins in city halls on several items, the 
former also pushed for reform provisions which would serve 
their units only. 
Counties agreed with cities on three basic items. 
First, both types of government agressively argued for local 
power, and secondary roles tor the federal and state govern-
ments. As Ralph Tabor, Director of Federal Affairs !or the 
National Association of Counties (NACO) (J3, p. 112) put it, 
federal and state authorities should occupy a •fallback 
position~ in employment and training. Not as vociferous as 
the cities about minimizing the role of states, counties 
nevertheless were skeptical that state governments could be 
responsive to community needs (JJ, pp. 1J6-17j). Secondly, 
county officials favored a maintenance of previous funding 
to an area through •hold-harmless" provisions, like their 
city counterparts (J4, p. 67). Third, both types of local 
government called for continuation of public employment. 
John v. Klein, also a NACO officer ()J, p. 145), felt that 
prime sponsors (which of course should include counties) 
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should be given the discretion to spend virtually any por-
tion of their grant allocations on public employment. 
Beyond these items, counties took off on their own. 
John Klein (33, pp. 136-138) said a need existed for coun-
ties to be prime sponsors in many areas where no sizeable 
city was present, yet where a sizeable population lived 
under county jurisdiction. Klein dismissed the idea of plac-
ing fairly populous counties, which lacked large cities, un-
der state stewardship. He felt there was a •paucity of plan-
ning resources inherent in balance of State status.• Ralph 
G. Caso, President of the New York State Association of 
Elected County Executives ()4, p. 69), thought reform legis-
lation should allow county prime sponsorships in high popu-
lation counties, even if they contained a large city. In 
Caso•s opinion, such an allowance would make more effective 
coordination possible. Ralph Tabor (3), p. 172) asked for 
incentives to be made available for local government spon-
sorships in a labor market area to coordinate their activi-
ties. 
Such a stance, favoring county autonomy, was backed up 
with the results of a NACO staff study, presented to Senators 
by Klein (33, p. 151). The data showed that, as of the be-
ginning of the 1970s, most of the nation's poor and unem-
ployed lived outside of urban areas. Klein cited statist-
ics likes 
Of the 25,522,000 estimated poor in the 1970 cen-
sus data, 8,165,000--32 percent--lived in central 
cities while 17,355,000--68 percent--lived in sub-
urban and nonmetropolitan areas (33, p. 151), 
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or, as of 1969, 1,251,000 unemployed lived in •core urban 
areas• while 2,237,000 lived •outside those areas.• Yet, 
programs inherited from the 1960s were aimed at large cities. 
Aside from poor and unemployed persons, the bulk of the na-
tion's jobs were purported by the study to have moved to the 
suburbs. In Klein's words, "27 million labor force partici-
pants lived in the central cities, [while] over 55 million 
members of that group were in suburban and rural districts." 
These figures seemed to indicate a need to shift the empha-
sis of policy away from large cities and toward suburbs and 
rural areas. 
That indication, along with county opinion, such as 
Klein's (33, p. 150), that •other units of government have 
not demonstrated either their willingness or ability to deal 
with local areawide human resources problems,• while •coun-
ties have been quietly building this capacity for years,• 
formed the basis of county officials' demands for a status 
equal to states and cities in the reformed system. 
To a good extent, county and city objectives were to 
have a similarity of effect upon the direction of reform, 
even though the interests of each only partially coincided. 
County demands for full-fledged prime sponsorship status, and 
local power in general, coupled with city demands for the 
same things, meant that the system was more likely to be re-
shaped according to the decentralist ideal of community level 
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decision-making. This county/city alignment combined to 
greatly reduce chances of having a system in which the na-
tional or state governments would be the preeminent decision-
makers. Given that, plus the city/county support for "hold-
harmless," the way in which redistributive questions would 
be settled would be even more likely to follow the path re-
f erred to above in the section on cities. In other words, 
between the combined influence of cities and counties on re-
form proceedings, the probability that the redistributive is-
sue would be settled within an individual community's politi-
cal framework was increased. Local power, plus maintenance 
of past funding to an area, implied that established delivery 
organizations with established access to local politicians 
would have an edge over competitors. Additionally, both 
kinds of local government favored public employment, which 
served to strengthen that program's prospects. On the other 
hand, counties constituted a leading force pulling employ-
ment and training policy away from its earlier urban focus. 
This position would have the effect of helping to open up 
grant opportunities to a greater variety of recipients than 
was true under the 1960s' arrangement. Van Horn (J2, pp. 
157-159) felt this would assure a more distributive policy 
approach in the 1970s. 
PUBLIC SCHOOLS 
Public schools had been involved in much of the train-
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ing effort of pre-reform policy. Mirengoff and Rindler (Jl, 
p. 25) report that MDTA training funds had been distributed 
on a pass-through basis to states, which then generally dis-
bursed the money to off ices of the state employment service 
or public schools. According to Dr. Richard Gousha, Super-
intendent of Schools for Milwaukee, Wisconsin, and a spokes-
person for the Council of Great City Schools*, (JJ, pp. J93-
J94) federal laws had long mandated school involvement in 
education of the disadvantaged, vocational training, research 
and development and bilingual education. Since at least the 
late 1950s, in Gousha's view, the assistance provided to pub-
lic schools under those laws had "moved public school systems 
into the Federal political arena where we now find ourselves 
having to work simply to maintain the commitment we have made 
to the communities we serve.• Given such a history under the 
categorical system, it is no surprise that schools were con-
cerned about the possible results of decentralization. 
Anxiety over devolution of control to states and cities 
was expressed by representatives of the schools. Dr. Gousha 
(JJ, p. 396) did not wish to see states obtain control of 
funding, and demanded that money be passed through to local 
agencies. Likewise, Dr. Paul Briggs, Superintendent of 
Schools for Cleveland, Ohio (JJ, pp. 40)-405), was doubtful 
*an organization of 23 of the nation's largest city 
school systems with responsibility for approximately 5 mil-
lion pupils (JJ, pp. 381-382). 
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that city governments would be adequate repositories of em-
ployment and training authority. Briggs also doubted that 
programs of importance to school officials could be pro-
tected under revenue sharing. Finally, Briggs {J4, p. 148) 
wanted to avoid duplication of effort, which he thought 
would occur if training centers were established by prime 
sponsors, separate from ones already existing under local 
educational agencies. 
In order to have their anxieties eliminated, school 
officials asked for legislative guarantees that certain ex-
isting programs and funding arrangements not be disturbed. 
The Reverend George Smith of the San Diego School District 
and a spokesperson for the Council of Great City Schools, 
{33, p. 393) wanted school boards recognized as separate 
government agencies, since they derived authority from the 
states {just like city councils). Such recognition meant, 
for Smith, that "conceivably States would pass on a certain 
percentage of the manpower programs to the city school 
boards." Smith (JJ, pp. 381-382) demanded continuation of 
the Neighborhood Youth Corps (work and training for disad-
vantaged youngsters), EEA and programs for persons of limited 
English-speaking ability. Smith's position typified that of 
most public school officials voicing opinions on reform (33). 
They felt that some kind of guaranty of funds passed through 
to them, along with an allowance of the discretion appro-
priate for running programs, would constitute an acceptable 
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compromise, given the reformist trend. Dr. Briggs (JJ, p. 
405) made no pretense about his leaningsa • ••• we have been 
comfortable with the categorical aspects of the programs in 
the past. We have no objection to them." 
The schools' position would tend to help steer reform 
away from too radical a transference of power to subnational 
general governments, as well as away from too quick an aban-
donment of redistributive programs. The demands for guaran-
teed pass-through and for consideration of schools as separ-
ate agencies, represented opposition to the ascendance of 
states, cities and counties. The demands for protection of 
programs like Neighborhood Youth Corps, with a redistribu-
tive orientation, meant that schools constituted a signifi-
cant force for impeding any wholesale policy shift away from 
redistribution. Given public schools' sizeable and estab-
lished role in the employment and training system, plus the 
inevitability of other groups (notably anti-poverty organi-
zations) supporting many of the schools' demands, some con-
ditions on state and local government discretion were un-
avoidable. 
REPRESENTATIVES OF THE DISADVANTAGED 
Organizations representing the poverty community and 
disadvantaged minorities felt threatened by the reformist 
movement. The categorical programs that supported their 
existence, and the federal presence upon which they relied, 
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constituted two major targets of that movement. Being on 
the defensive, these organizations struggled to obtain leg-
islative provisions which would keep some federal strings 
unsevered--specifieally, the strings which amounted to life-
lines for many of them. Although some spokespersons for 
these groups paid lip-service to the reformist trend, they 
were in fact primarily interested in maintaining a great 
deal of categorization and centralization. To the extent 
that they perceived decentralization as inevitable, they 
wanted to be assured consideration for state and local gov-
ernment funding. 
One of the most active organizations of this kind was 
Jobs for Progress, Inc. This non-profit corporation admini-
stered an employment and training program for Spanish-speak-
ing persons, called SER--funded largely through the u.s. 
Departments of Labor and Health Education and Welfare (HEW) 
(33. p. 557). Ricardo Zazueta, National Executive Director 
of Jobs for Progress (33, pp. 549-579), spoke for this group~ 
interests during reform proceedings. While voicing support 
for reform through legislation and acknowledging the •tran-
sition into revenue sharing," Zazueta wished to "maintain 
the integrity of the only national vehicle for the Spanish-
speaking." He presented a letter addressed to President 
Nixon, during Congressional hearings, which called for an ex-
tension of SER's national contract and retention of its ex-
isting level of funding through the coming fiscal year1 1974. 
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The letter bore the signatures of 97 members of Congress. 
Anticipating decentralization, Zazueta wanted his group to 
be considered for funding and program eligibility under both 
DOL and state and local jurisdictions. 
Dr. Leon Sullivan, of OICs of America (33, pp. 590-595), 
petitioned for similar provisions under reform. While Sulli-
van had •no quarrel• with President Nixon's policy objec-
tives, he nevertheless demanded special consideration for 
OICs, because of fears that subnational govermaents would 
neglect them. Sullivan wanted quantitative guarantees of 
future state and local OIC funding. 
Charles Braithwait, speaking for Community Action di-
rectors (33, pp. 217-221), also acknowledged the probability 
of decentralization, and, like the above spokespersons, asked 
for a degree of limitation upon subnational discretion. 
Braithwait wanted legislative languages 
••• making CAA.a presumed recipients of Community Ac-
tion funds ••• by requiring local officials to make a 
negative finding (against clear standards for effec-
tive services to the poor established in federal 
policies, and in a public process) if they wish not 
to fund CAAa (33, pp. 217-221), 
as well as •clear guidelines for the development of replace-
ment vehicles for those Cils not funded by local officials.• 
Representatives of the disadvantaged were modifying 
their policy positions in the face of generally unfavorable 
circumstances, yet they still enjoyed significant support. 
Undoubtedly, their popular constituencies remained, despite 
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the eclipse of the 1960s by the cost-conscious 1970s. In 
Congress these groups still had access to some of the most 
powerful legislators in both parties. For example, Dr. Sull-
ivan (JJ, p. 590) expressed gratitude to Republican Senator 
Javits as he thanked Democrat Kennedy, for sympathizing with 
OICs. Thus, representatives of the disadvantaged promised 
a tenacious struggle over the outcome of employment and 
training reform. 
That tenacity meant that, if a comprehensive bill did 
,n2! ade~uately embody the demands of these groups, they were 
sure to try for separate legislation to meet their interests. 
In fact, such attempts were in progress in 1973 (JJ, pp. 502, 
590). Passage of any such separate legislation would make 
a general reform bill that much less comprehensive, and the 
scope of decentralization, decategorization and consolida-
tion that much narrower. 
On the other hand, to the extent that the reform bill 
did embody the demands of spokespersons for the disadvantaged, 
that bill would unavoidably contain attenuations of reformist 
principles. More specifically, the federal government would 
have to continue to bear direct responsibility for a sizeable 
portion of employment and training delivery. Also, some cat-
egorical restrictions on fund usage and program design by 




While not averse to federal employment and training 
programs, business groups preferred to limit the federal 
role to the setting of general goals and the disbursement of 
relatively condition-free grants--as SRS called for. Also, 
business groups were on the lookout for a chance to play a 
larger implementation role themselves. In this respect, 
they called for a greater voice in planning and program de-
sign, as well as for continuation of a friendly federal at-
titude toward private sector programs, like NAB/JOBS. Fi-
nally, business persons were cool toward public employment, 
because they expected that program to have negative effects 
on the free-enterprise economy. 
General support for reform, along revenue sharing 
lines, was expressed by business leaders during the period of 
the early 1970s. Thomas P. Walsh, speaking for the U.S. Cham-
ber of Commerce (J4, pp. 186-189), urged Congress to go ahead 
with a major reduction of federal control over implementation. 
A key point, which Walsh made to members of Congress during 
hearings, was that DOL should not play a big part in the ap-
proval of prime sponsors' plans. He would have preferred 
that prime sponsors certify their compliance with federal 
guidelines, "with on-site inspections generally limited to 
inquiries of allegations concerning the misuse of funds." 
William C. Woodward, of the NAB (42, p. 4)4) also favored 
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greater subnational autonomy, and thought the -basic prem-
ises• of revenue sharing were "sound.• 
Expecting decentralization to occur, business spokes-
persons wished to continue that community's involvement in 
employment and training. As Woodward put ita 
••• for the same reasons that the involvement of 
private industry has been a vital part of the suc-
cess of national manpower programs--business partic-
ipation will be essential in making good local man-
power decisions. 
It is the local businessmen who know where the 
jobs are--where they will be--and what kind of 
training will be most effective--in the schools and 
on the job (42, p. 434). 
Willard F. Rockwell, Chairman of the Board of North American 
Rockwell (42, p. 471), also felt that industry had an impor-
tant part to play in job-creation and training •. Rockwell 
emphasized the need for federal funding of new programs in 
that substantive area through which business could partici-
pate. Walsh, of the Chamber of Commerce (J4, p. 188) told 
members of Congress that NAB/JOBS was a worthy program. In 
Walsh's view, under revenue sharing, NA.B in cooperation with 
the federal government could •continue to perform an impor-
tant function by designing and merchandising innovative man-
power programs among private employers.• 
The tendency of business interests to oppose, or to 
support a limited version of, public employment, was touched 
on earlier in this paper. Recall Walsh's desire to prevent 
new public jobs from competing with private ones. Walsh was 
emphatic about making public employment a program for ~-
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sitional jobs--perhaps up to two years. He wanted clients 
for such a program to be only the neediest, in terms of time 
unemployed and other factors1 such as whether there is no 
other •full-time adult wage earner in the immediate family.• 
Additionally, the Chamber of Commerce spokesperson was 
against a funding floor for public employment being install-
ed in authorizing legislation. In Walsh's view, such a floor 
would usurp •the traditional responsibility of Congressional 
appropriations committees• {J4, pp. 186-189). 
It was true that reform along revenue sharing lines 
represented a theoretical threat to certain categorical pro-
grams run by private industries. Yet, on the whole, the 
business sector tended to prefer a roll-back of the federal 
presence because of expectations of better program results 
coming from the subnational political process. There exist-
ed possibilities for businesses to expand their participation 
in program design and operation and to bring expertise to 
bear through that process. By helping the policy transition 
to a decentralized, decategorized mode, businesses were con-
tributing to an opening up of the employment and training 
system. Successfully capitalizing on that opening, private 
firms might displace many non-profit organizations as well 
as other business competitors who had previously enjoyed 
regular federal grant contracts. 
109 
ORG.A.?UZED LABOR 
Labor leaders were some of the most outspoken support-
ers of centralization and categorization, as well as of pub-
lic employment. Already experienced with federal training 
programs from the 1960s (JO, p. 56), many unions were skepti-
cal of the logic of revenue sharing. While some union lo-
cals have disapproved of government programs in this policy 
area--fearing the programs would compete with union training 
activities, and adversely affect average wages and working 
conditions--federations and national organizations have 
showed a greater tendency to support such programs (8, p. 
453). When early reform proposals were made in Congress, 
labor leaders criticized the notion of handing program re-
sponsibility over to the states (seeing states as unable or 
unwilling to do an adequate job) and called for federal job-
creation (5, p. 26, 10, p. 6). That stance was still in 
evidence at the time of CETA's passage. 
The AFL-CIO, as umbrella organization for much of 
labor, carried union demands for federal action to Capitol 
Hill in 1973. That organization's legislative expert, Ken-
neth Young (3~. pp. 127-131), spoke to members of Congress 
in favor of DOL-sponsored programs for special target groups, 
a "federalized• Employment Service and a major role for DOL 
in approving prime sponsors' grants. In Young's words• 
We oppose ••• the administration's no-strings man-
power revenue sharing approach. We believe that 
unemployment is a national problem that requires 
overall Federal control of policy, direction, and 
standards (33, p. 489). 
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The need for job-creation by the federal government 
was a theme which unions sounded consistently. According to 
Ginzberg (10, p. 6), organized labor unsuccessfully supported 
an effort by Democrats to establish a public employment pro-
gram in 1970. Unions were also big supporters of EEA (33, 
p. 486). In 1973. labor groups argued for a continuation of 
public employment. Kenneth Young and AFL-CIO economist Dr. 
Markley Roberts (JJ, p. 486) pointed out that decentraliza-
tion and decategorization were ~ concepts which would guar-
anty delivery of jobs. They claimed (J4, p. 131) that most 
training occurs .2,!l-the-job, and therefore public employment 
could serve to complete a comprehensive effort by supple-
menting training activities. Young and Roberta (JJ, p. 487) 
desired creation of a million jobs (a truly wishful request), 
but understood that avoidance of a veto would necessitate 
scaling down that demand. Culhane (JO) reveals that Young 
spent a lot of time negotiating with federal policymakers to 
get a public employment funding floor spelled out in compre-
hensive authorizing legislation. 
While the AFL-CIO wanted retention of· the 1960s ap-
proach, and labor's role under that approach, it understood 
that changes were on the way. Accordingly, Young (J4, p. 130) 
informed members of Congress of the federation's preference 
for a basic grant formula under an SRS-style system. It 
111 
consisted of three relative measurements for an areaa (a) 
unemployed persons, (b) adults below the poverty line, and 
(c) underemployed persons. The AFL-CIO rejected utilization 
of persons in the labor force as a factor, because it would 
not provide benefits according to where the greatest need was. 
Beside attempting to influence the basic formula, the labor 
organization called for assurances that unions would partici-
pate in planning and comment and review proceedings (J4, p. 
131). 
The position of the unions was diametrically opposed to 
the reformist movement. Having access to Capitol Hill, as 
well as some established territory in the employment and 
training system, unions represented a major force for pre-
venting a clean sweep by revenue sharing advocates. Union 
calls for maintenance of federal influence, for targeting, and 
for public employment, in concert with similar demands made 
by the poverty community and others, meant that an ideologi-
cal compromise would be unavoidable in the final analysis. 
VOCATIONAL EDUCATORS 
Professionals in the field of vocational education had 
a tradition of their own and a unique place in the employment 
and training system, which they sought to protect. While vo-
cational agencies had, in conjunction with the U.S. Training 
and Employment Service, •played the leading role in provid-
ing skill training" up until 1973 (Jl, p. 89), their training 
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curriculum was characterized as outdated and unresponsive to 
public needs (5, p. 4). In addition, the role of vocational 
agencies in the training ot target groups under MDTA (22) 
meant those agencies were associated with the old categori-
cal system. Thus, vocational educators were forced to fight 
a defensive battle during reform proceedings, and expressed 
concerns about leaving too much responsibility to subnational 
general governments. 
The crux of the matter, for vocational officials, was 
to prevent any newly proposed agencies (whether general gov-
ernment prime sponsors or appendages thereof) from usurping 
powers held by established public education and training 
units. Lowell A. Burkett, Executive Director of the Ameri-
can Vocational Association (AVA) (J), pp. 607-616), called 
for "a definitive and responsible statutory role for state 
and local public education and training agencies in the plan-
ning and administration of education and training programs." 
More specifically, Burkett wanteda 
••• the public vocational ••• agency [to] be given an 
equal role with the prime sponsors for the plan-
ning and administration of the education and train-
ing com~onent of any manpower legislation (JJ, pp. 
607-616). 
He also made sure to voice opposition to notions of allowing 
proposed advisory councils (to be attached to prime sponsors) 
into the "operation and administration" responsibilities of 
existing state and local agencies. c. M. Lawrence, Presi-
dent of AVA (34, pp. 140-142) agreed with Burkett, indicating 
113 
concern over the unpredictability of programs under revenue 
sharing. Lawrence wanted vocational education assistance, 
which might be forthcoming under reform, to be distributed 
•in the jurisdiction of the State board for vocational educa-
tion.• Lawrence felt there had been a tendency among sub-
national general governments to neglect vocational training 
centers. 
Aside from fighting to defend their administrative 
territory within a given state, vocational officials wanted 
to retain the federal influence of the 1960s as regarded tar-
get programs for the disadvantaged. Having become heavily 
involved with such programs, they had a natural interest in 
seeing the programs continued. Burkett (33, pp. 607-616) 
specified Neighborhood Youth Corps, training of persons with 
limited English-speaking skills, offender rehabilitation, 
and supportive services for veterans, as examples. He saw 
a need for •a continuity of involvement of the appropriate 
federal human resources agency• on educational policy, and 
called for DOL and HEW to be involved in approval of expendi-
tures. In this way, vocational officials added support to 
the combination of forces struggling for maintenance of cen-
tralization and categorization. 
What vocational educators wanted, by demanding a role 
on the same level with prime sponsors in training affairs, 
was to preserve a certain institutional framework, of which 
they were an integral part. If a reform bill were to provide 
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for that equal status, that bill would represent such a 
dilution of reformist ideals as to constitute a defeat for 
true believers in those ideals. In other words, by allow-
ing vocational agencies, or any other agency, equal footing 
with elected general governments, the objectives of consoli-
dation and deference to the subnational political process 
would not be fully realized. If the bill did not incorpor-
ate vocational educators in an equal fashion with general 
governments, it nevertheless was likely to address the de-
mands of the former. Vocational schools were fixtures in 
America's training system, and, regardless of charges of out-
dated curricula, were expected to continue as such. Reform 
was not to be so broad in scope as to threaten elimination of 
vocational education's legislative and financial base. Thus, 
with the new system of prime sponsors coming into place 
alongside the older institutional framework, it seemed that 
connections between the two structural forms would be bi-
laterally beneficial. Prime sponsors could utilize voca-
tional education's facilities and personnel, and vocational 
educators could obtain funding and clients from prime spon-
sors. The difference from the past would lie in the revoca-
tion of presumptive provider status from vocational agencies 
in certain programs. 
U.S. TRAINING AND EMPLOYMENT SERVICE 
The u.s. Training and Employment Service was an old· 
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line bureaucracy, which was established in 1933 (4, p. 11}. 
According to Mirengoff and Rindler (Jl, p. 10,), it was •the 
repository of experience in most aspects of manpower activi-
ties," and had played a major part in implementing the cate-
gorical programs of the 1960s. Thus, any discussion of em-
ployment and training reform would have to include considera-
tion of Training and Employment Service objectives. 
When Congress began hearings on reform in 1969-70, the 
Service was coming under attack from liberals for being un-
responsive to disadvantaged minorities (S, pp. 26-28). That 
criticism, and the implications of decentralization, decate-
gorization and consolidation, spelled a possible threat to 
the Service's preeminent position in the delivery system. 
Van Horn (32, P. 65) reports that the Service did wish to 
maintain its established role. However, no official opinion 
was forthcoming at the hearings from the Interstate Confer-
ence of Employment Security .Agencies (!CESA), which repre-
sented the Service's branches nationwide (5, p. 28). 
By 1973, when it appeared that revenue sharing ideas 
were going to be realized in legislation, the Service had 
developed an official position--one designed to protect its 
own interests and go with the flow at the same time. That 
year (33, p. 649) !CESA stood in favor of decentralization 
and decategorization, but insisted upon a strong role for 
state governments in planning and administration. Local gov-
ernments, according to !CESA, lacked sufficient knowledge in 
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employment and training affairs, and therefore should not be 
entrusted with primary responsibility for implementation. 
Perhaps it was natural to call for a state emphasis, since 
bureaucratic ties already existed between Service off ices and 
state governments. Tnough federally-chartered and funded, 
the Service consisted of "50 semi-autonomous agencies" {31, 
p. 103) which were state-run (5, p.J). Locally-generated pro-
grams might have led to too much disruption of the Service's 
place in the delivery system. 
A demand for greater state influence in implementation, 
coming from "the repository of experience• in this policy 
area {31, p. 103), represented pressure against extreme decen-
tralization. It also represented the acceptance, by an old 
bureaucracy, of a more openly political approach to imple-
mentation decisions. 
SUMMARY OF ACTORS' OBJECTIVES 
The Nixon Administration wanted to apply the special 
revenue sharing (SRS) concept to employment and training. 
SRS would enable the transfer of federal funds to states and 
localities with a minimum of strings attached. Recipient 
governments would be automatically entitled to a share of 
money (determined by national formula), which would have to 
be spent in a certain broadly-defined substantive area. 
Mogulof's (46) assessment of SRS charges the federal govern-
ment with responsibility for general goals while subnationals 
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determine specific means. The Administration adhered closely 
to SRS when it stated its position in reform deliberations 
and consistently set the tone of those deliberations. 
State governments were eager proponents of decentrali-
zation, and sought to preempt local governments in the con-
test for new responsibilities. Governors felt they could co-
ordinate services within states--something local units could 
not possibly accomplish, in the Governors' view. State offi-
cials also called for a simplification of grant disbursement 
methods through use of standard formulae. The high motiva-
tion and increasing capabilities of state officials meant 
that a greater state role in employment and training was on 
the immediate horizon. 
Cities also favored decentralist, consolidationist re-
form, but made special demands for a "bottoms-up• approach 
to program design and implementation. Cities wanted to be 
treated as prime sponsors, receiving federal funds directly. 
Two other city demands, related to the need to keep federal 
money flowing to urban areas, were for "hold-harmless• pro-
visions and public employment. To the extent that reform 
would encompass a localistic approach and •hold-harmless• 
provisions, programs could be expected to reflect existing 
political arrangements in a community. Furthermore, the 
city position served to improve the outlook for continuation 
of both the 1960s' urban emphasis and an EEA-style jobs pro-
gram. 
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County officials agreed with cities on three pointsa 
(a) programs should be largely the product of local design, 
(b) "hold-harmless" was necessary to prevent disruptions in 
the system, and (c) public employment was indispensable. 
Yet, counties also wanted prime sponsorship status and to 
effect a shift in policy focus from urban to non-urban areas. 
The coincidence of county and city objectives meant that the 
prospect for decentralization was enhanced and that estab-
lished program providers in a given community would have an 
edge over competitors. Also, the probability of an extension 
of public employment was increased by that coincidence. Yet, 
counties were a force contributing to an opening up of grant 
opportunities to jurisdictions and organizations hitherto 
uninvolved. If they had their way, employment and training 
programs might become as common in suburban and rural loca-
tions as they had been in cities--and those programs might 
have an impact which would be more distributive than redis-
tributive. 
Public school systems held still another view of reform 
proposals. They wanted to maintain federal guarantees that 
money would be passed through to them and were pessimistic 
about turning over funding and program authority to state and 
local general governments. School officials wanted recogni-
tion as independent grant recipients and/or requirements 
which would assure continuation of certain categorical pro-
grams in which they had an interest. They constituted a 
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force favoring both a categorical and a redistributive ap-
proach, as well as opposing the aacendance of general sub-
national governments. 
Representatives of socially disadvantaged groups 
struggled to maintain enough federal control over programs 
to enable continuation of the special target approach of the 
1960s. They wanted legislative provisions which would either 
extend federal contracts with organizations serving the poor 
and neglected minorities, or guarantees of benefits under a 
decentralized system. The fact that these forces possessed 
both access to influential policymakers and sizeable con-
stituencies, meant that some targeting of the disadvantaged 
for special consideration would be likely. Thus, to some ex-
tent, decentralization and decategorization were liable to 
occur in a moderated form. 
Business associations backed the Nixon Administration 
to a large extent1 by voicing support of revenue sharing and 
skepticism on the value of public employment. They also 
wanted to affect subnational programs and have the federal 
government look favorably upon private sector efforts in em-
ployment and training. While some categoricals in which 
private firms had an interest might suffer, the business com-
munity saw a chance to roll-back the overall federal presence 
and affect programs through the subnational political process 
under reform. 
Labor groups were proponents of public jobs, as well as 
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a centralized employment and training system. Claiming that 
most training occurs on-the-job, and that government hiring 
could supplement training programs, labor groups demanded a 
large-scale public employment effort. They were basically 
skeptical about decentralization and stressed the need for 
nationwide consistency of service and targeting of needy seg-
ments of the population. Acknowledging the probability of 
grant reform, unions voiced a preference for a basic funding 
formula which they felt would serve those needy segments. 
Finally, unions wanted a national policy statement to include 
guarantees of organized labor's participation in planning and 
program reviews. Effectively in alliance with educators and 
poverty/disadvantaged constituencies, these unions acted as a 
major force which might thwart the most radical tendencies 
of the reform movement. 
Vocational educators were primarily concerned with pre-
venting the fosteri13g of agencies which might compete with 
vocational schools in delivering training services. Partic-
ularly, they wanted statutory provisions guarding against a 
usurpation of their territory by general government prime 
sponsors, or newly-created appendages thereof. Additionally, 
vocational educators wished to protect categorical programs 
in which they had become heavily involved over the years. 
Their demand for federal authority over spending fit with de-
mands for continued categorization, belying a viewpoint which 
was less than sympathetic toward the ideology of decentrali-
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zation and decategorization. 
The u.s. Training and Employment Service, like voca-
tional schools, represented an entrenched set of interests 
facing a possible loss of presumptive provider status. The 
Service came up with an official policy position which was 
designed to enable it to adapt to change, but retain as much 
of its territory as possible. That position called essen-
tially for an emphasis on the role of state governments in 
planning and administration, and downplayed the ability of 
local units to bear program responsibilities. It appeared 
natural for the Service to stress the need for state control 
because the Service already possessed important bureaucratic 
ties to that level of government. While such a stance repre-
sented an effort to modify the swing toward wholesale decen-
tralization, it also represented an acceptance of change in 




CETA of 197) reflected a blend of the above contrib-
utory factors, with some factors having a greater effect 
than others upon the nature of the legislation. 
Decentralization and decategorization of much of the 
employment and training system were accomplished under 
CETA's first two Titles; Title I covering •comprehensive 
Manpower Services• ( 11, p. 42206), and Title I_I for •Public 
Employment Programs• (11, p. 42209). Henceforth, prime 
sponsorships of state and local general governments would 
design and implement many programs with an unprecedented 
minimum of federal interference. Most importantly, prime 
sponsors were given the authority to determine the actual 
mix of program activities, as well as funding priorities 
for those activities, within their jurisdictions (11, pp. 
42206-42211). As long as sponsors adhered to the fairly 
loose federal guidelines for these Titles (11, pp. 42206-
42211), they would be relatively free, compared to a cate-
gorical arrangement (matching requirements, which might di-
vert subnational resources toward nationally-imposed goals, 
were conspicuously absent). State and loca1 discretion was 
also enhanced in the Act's allowance for sponsors to freely 
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transfer funds. received under either Title I or II. between 
most activities allowed under the Act. Whether or not a 
sponsorship qualified for Title II money (i.e •• contained a 
high unemployment area) it could choose to spend its allot-
ment on public employment, targeting of poverty populations 
or numerous other activities, in any combination it wished 
(11, pp. 42206-42211). 
Further decentralization and decategorization occurred 
through a provision limiting the proportion of Clrl'A appro-
priations which could go for Title III and IV (federally-
administered) programs, to 2°" of the CETA appropriation for 
a fiscal year (excluding anything over $250 million appro-
priated for Title II in figuring the base amount for this 
percentage) (11, p. 42206). This meant that the vast bulk 
of CETA funds would be subject to subnational discretion. 
Also, provisions for a cross-section of social groups at 
state and local level to have an advisory input on program 
plannil"lg and evaluation was made (11, pp. 42207-42208) in 
order to enhance community participation. 
The impact of several of the contributory factors dis-
cussed in this paper can be seen in those characteristics of 
the Act which accomplished decentralization and decategori-
zation. Pre-CETA reform attempts pointed to the need for 
administrative entities with sufficient authority and scope 
of jurisdiction to implement the new system. That. plus the 
development of experience and expertise by subnational 
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government officials during those reform attempts, contrib-
uted to the division of responsibilities in the Act whereby 
state and local governments were charged with prime sponsor-
ship. Another systemic factor which led to this feature of 
CETA was the set of recognized errors in the 1960s' arrange-
ment (which was lacking in responsiveness to local condi-
tions). Added to these factors werea ideological emphasis 
upon the subnational political process as the preferred arena 
for setting program priorities, pressures exerted by the 
Nixon Administration, state and local governments and busi-
ness groups, and discontent with federal domination (evident 
in the early 1970s' political climate), all of which served 
to ensure CETA's accomplishment of decentralization and de-
eategorization. 
Despite the historic devolution of power from federal 
to state and local governments which the reform of 1973 
achieved, some centralization and categorization were main-
tained by CETA. The most prominent legislative features in 
this respect werea the Title authorizing DOL to administer 
programs directly for •special Target Groups• (Title III) 
(11, p. 42211) and the Title authorizing continuation of the 
Job Corps under :federal supervision ('l'itle IV) (11, p. 42213). 
Title III mandated that the Secretary of Labor •provide ad-
ditional manpower services• toa 
••• segments of the population that are in particu-
lar need of such services, including youth, offend-
ers, persons of limited English-speaking ability, 
older workers, and other persons which the Sec-
retary determines have particular disadvantages 
in the labor market (11, p. 42211). 
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Included in this Title were specifics on programs for those 
with a language disadvantage, offenders, native Americans, 
migrant and seasonal farmworkers and youth (11, pp. 42211-
42212). The Job Corps Title provided for continuation of 
that training and work experience program for #low-income 
disadvantaged young men and women,• prescribed •standards 
and procedures for selecting individuals as enrollees" and 
delineated "various other powers, duties, and responsibili-
ties• for administration of the Corps (11, p. 42213). Titles 
III and IV were for federally-controlled, categorical pro-
grams, and it was the Secretary of Labor (to some extent in 
consultation with the Secretary of Health, Education and Wel-
fare) who was to possess authority over the programs there-
of--that is, the power of final decision on the specifics of 
activities engaged in, clients served, provider organiza-
tions and fund allocations (11, pp. 42211-42217). 
In addition to the above two Titles, some federal in-
fluence was maintained in the implementation of Titles I and 
II by prime sponsors, as well as in the form of percentages 
of appropriations to be disposed of at the discretion of the 
Secretary of Labor. Federal guidelines to be met in prime 
sponsors' plans (to receive DOL approval) were not so strict 
as to be called categorical in nature, yet furnished some 
limitations upon the freedom of subnational governments. 
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For example, to receive Title I funds, state and local plans 
had to provide for use of MOTA-established skills centers 
•to the extent feasible• if institutional training was to be 
a program activity. Other examples of such federal guide-
lines includeda requirements that state sponsorships •pro-
vide for the cooperation and participation of all State 
agencies• offering employment and training services, certain 
priorities to be met in carrying out public employment (such 
as giving special consideration to veterans or persons unem-
ployed the longest), and that sponsors' plans assure •to the 
maximum extent feasible• that services and opportunities will 
go to •those most in need of them• (mentioning low-income 
clients and those of limited English-speaking ability) or 
that "the need for continued funding of programs of demon-
strated effectiveness is taken into account• in serving the 
needy. The Secretary of Labor was authorized to designate 
prime sponsors, outside the basic designation, under special 
circumstances, could revoke or reallocate grant money upon 
' 
determination of sponsor malfeasance, and was charged with 
the disbursement of 6% of Title I appropriations as well as 
20% of Title II appropriations at Secretarial discretion 
(but taking into account the needs for holding harmless, 
-programs of demonstrated effectiveness• and •the severity 
of unemployment• in assisting particular areas {11, pp. 
42206-42211). 
Schools, unions, anti-poverty organizations and ideo-
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logical liberals did not go away from the formulation proc-
ess without obtaining some provision for the national effort 
they desired. Yet, in comparison with the categorical pro-
grams replaced by CETA, Titles III and IV appeared to be more 
the result of a salvage operation than somethi11g to cele-
brate, for these groups. After all, those Titles had limits 
placed on them in terms of the portion of CETA appropria-
tions which could be spent on them and did not authorize as 
extensive a federal role as the centralists would have pre-
ferred. The federal guidelines for Title I and II plans 
also represented a minor success at beet for centralization 
and categorization. Phrases like •to the maximum extent 
feasible,• and •programs of demonstrated effectiveness• (11, 
p. 42207), could be interpreted and qualified in numerous 
ways. The guidelines posed little threat to the freedom of 
prime sponsors to determine the actual makeup of programs. 
Finally, the monies earmarked for disbursement at the discre-
tion of the Secretary of Labor (under Titles I and II) 
amounted to minor fractions of the quantities subject to the 
discretion of state and local governments. 
The employment and training system was simplified by 
CETA's provisions for reducing the number of federal con-
tracts, consolidating local activities, instituting formula-
funding and otherwise reducing duplication of effort and lack 
of coordination. Seventeen national categorical programs ()2, 
p. 6), which had generated about 10,000 separate contracts 
128 
between DOL and providers (40, p. 25702), were combined under 
a single Act yielding grants to 500 prime sponsors (JO, p. 
51) plus some native American tribes and some other special 
jurisdictions (11. pp. 42206, 42209). Further consolidation 
was accomplished by replacing uncoordinated competition 
among local providers with unified efforts under the umbrel-
la of a single plan in each prime sponsorship. Instead of 
separate deliberations over the funding of thousands of dif-
ferent projects, with attendant perturbations in the flow of 
dollars, CETA presented two simple formulae for the auto-
matic distribution of funds. Recipients under Title I weuld 
have allocations determined according to existing levels of 
previous funding, and their populations of unemployed and 
adults in •1ow-income- families (earning $7 1 000 in 1969 
terms, adjusted for inflation thereafter) (11, P• 42207). 
Title II recipients would obtain automatic funding according 
to the size of their unemployed populations (11, p. 42209). 
Several other provisions in the Act were incorporated to en-
sure a more efficient system. For example, consortia ot 
subnational governments could constitute a prime sponsorship 
under !itle I, defined as •any combination of units of gener-
al government which includes any unit of general local gov-
ernment qualifying [as a regular prime sponsor with 100,000 
or more population]"(ll, p. 42206). Up to five percent of 
Title I appropriations were earmarked for use by the Secre-
tary of Labor -to encourage• formation of these consortia 
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(11, p. 42207). Under Title II, provision was made for •pro-
gram agents.• These would be local governments with between 
50,000 and 100,000 population, having high unemployment areas, 
and falling under a prime sponsor's jurisdiction. Program 
agents would be charged with •funding, overseeing, and mon-
itoringp public employment programs consistent with the prime 
sponsor's application for a Title II grant (11, p. 42209). 
Various other components of the Act also aimed at eliminating 
duplication of effort. Title I state sponsorships were 
charged with the •coordination of all manpower plans in a 
State so as to eliminate conflict, duplication, and overlap-
ping between manpower services• (11, p. 42208). References 
to the effect that intormation should be shared and existing 
facilities should be utilized are sprinkled throughout the 
Act, although they are not all in the form of legislative com-
mands (11, pp. 42206-42219). 
While such features of CETA could be traced back to 
consolidation ideas, which were praised in many quarters, two 
sources stand out. One was the set of lessons learned from 
assessments of the pre-CETA delivery system and the early re-
form attempts (i.e., systemic factors). The other major 
source for these provisions lay in the Nixon Administration's 
concept of revenue sharing. Recognition of problems with the 
system of the 1960s led to widespread calls for simplifying 
administrative channels, reducing interagency competition and 
combining service efforts at the local level. Experiences 
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with CEP, CAMPS and CMP pointed out the possibilities and 
pitfalls of coordinating the energies of those participating 
in implementation. The Administration's revenue sharing 
proposals set the conceptual boundaries for reform debates 
by insisting upon formula-funding and consolidation of the 
many existing categoricals into •broad-purpose grants• (41, 
p. 93). These ideas were picked up on and carried along by 
an increasing number of influential actors, such as business 
associations and state officials, and were quite successful-
ly realized in the Act of 197). 
CETA's provision !or public employment warrants separ-
ate consideration. This feature of the Act stood out from 
other aspects of the bill. One way in which it was differ-
ent was in its substance. Public employment is conceptually 
distinct from the other training and supportive services usu-
ally found in employment and training legislation. This is 
because it offers direct-hiring of clients--and in the pub-
lic sector--as opposed to efforts at training and inducing 
private employers to take on new personnel. Additionally, 
CETA's incorporation of public employment was special in 
that there was no mandate that such a program be carried out 
at all. While Title II authorized disbursement of funds to 
high unemployment areas and prescribed loose guidelines for 
operating public employment, it also contained a section 
which reada 
Funds available under this title to an eligible 
applicant [i.e. , sponsor] may, at its option, be 
utilized for residents of the areas of substan-
tial unemployment designated under this title for 
programs authorized under title I and ••• [the spe-
cial target programs] of title III of this Act 
(11, p. 42211). 
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Thus, it would be legal for sponsorships with high unemploy-
ment to receive Title II money and not spend it on public 
hiring, as long as it was for the benefit of residents of the 
high unemployment area. 
The origins of CETA's public employment authorization 
were also unique, compared with the rest of the bill. This 
portion of CETA could just as easily have been saved for a 
separate piece of legislation, since it was not part of the 
reformist repertoire of decentralization, decategorization 
and consolidation. Strong calls for public employment came 
equally from advocates and opponents of the reformist-reve-
nue sharing idea. State and local governments, which were 
clearly in favor of revenue sharing, were as adamant in de-
mandi?!g public employment as were labor unions (which criti-
cized revenue sharing). The ideological debate over public 
employment focused upon the question of whether the public 
or private sector was best suited for creating jobs. On the 
other hand, the debate over revenue sharing focused not upon 
the question of public versus private sector, but upon the 
relative roles of national and subnational governments. 
Lastly, it was the recessionary economy, and not considera-
tions of either responsiveness or efficiency, which provided 
1J2 
the major impetus for inclusion of a public jobs program in 
CETA. 
On the face of it, CETA's public employment provision 
(11, pp. 42209-42211) would not appear to represent a vic-
tory for advocates of such a program, since this activity 
was not required. Also, forces less than sympathetic to 
public hiring managed to squeeze some concessions out of Con-
gress in the form of restrictions on carrying on this activi-
ty where it might harm the private labor market or lead to 
corruption or abuse. For example, public employment pro-
grams were prohibited from fostering substitution of federal 
money for state or local government revenues in employing 
people (11, p. 42210). Some phrases were also included which 
could be viewed as potentially protective of non-government 
enterprises and organizations. For instance, public employ-
ment programs were forbidden to "result in the displacement 
of currently employed workers• or to •impair existing con-
tracts• (11, p. 42211). Such restrictions can be traced 
back to the complaints, such as those of business groups, 
concerning problems tney expected from ~overnment job-
creation. 
However, looking at this feature of CETA from a broad-
er perspective, it appears that it did represent a victory 
for public employment advocates. The primary consideration 
in this respect was that it was common knowledge that simply 
allowing such an activity would result in its widespread 
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implementation by state and local governments. This was due 
to the political popularity of dispensing jobs to the unem-
ployed. Beside that, the bill's Title II funding floor of 
$250 million for fiscal year 1974 and $350 million for fis-
cal year 1975, plus authorization of "such sums as may be 
necessary• for the fiscal years ending in 1974, 1975, 1976 
and 1977 (11, p. 42206) represented a refutation of the ide-
ology of prohibiting or strictly limiting public employment. 
This characteristic of the Act was enhanced further by its 
allowance for sponsors (who may not be eligible under Title 
II) to spend as much of their basic grant as they chose on 
public employment (11, pp. 42206-42209). Finally, the Act 
defined public employment jobs as •transitional• yet placed 
no definite time limit upon their duration (11, pp. 42209-
42211). 
Another major question resolved with the passage of 
CETA was that of the desirability of mandated redistribu-
tion. Basically, the outcome of reform proceedings was un-
favorable to those calling for maintenance of federally-im-
posed, structural anti-poverty programs of the 1960s' type. 
This outcome was related both to the prevailing political and 
economic atmosphere of the early 1970s and to the relative 
strengths of groups involved in the formulation of the Act. 
Economic conditions ensured that CETA would be based at least 
as much upon counter-cyclical considerations as upon counter-
structural ones. The political climate, antagonistic to 
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federal hegemony, made for difficulties in obligating states 
and localities to address redistributive issues. In addition, 
the Nixon Administration, business groups and state and lo-
cal officials, desiring an opening up of the system and a 
wider distribution of benefits, overpowered groups (e.g., 
CAAs} pushing for mandated redistribution. 
Titles III and IV represented the Act's incorporation 
of redistributive thinking. As mentioned above, the express-
ed purpose of those parts of the bill was to assist persona 
with labor market disadvantages, and between them, those 
Titles were relatively specific as to their intended clien-
tele and the kind of programs to be implemented {11, pp. 
42211-42217). Requirements placed upon DOL under Titles III 
and IV left little room for the possible conversion of those 
programs into channels for distributive subsidies. For ex-
ample, under Title III, DOL was obligated to assist persons 
of limited English-speaking abilities by •the teaching of oc-
cupational skills in the primary language of such persons for 
occupations which do not require a high proficiency in Eng-
lish• (11, p. 42211). Title IV specified that a client must 
be1 
••• a low-income individual or member of a low-
income family, who requires additional education, 
training, or intensive counseling and related as-
sistance in order to serve and hold meaningful em-
ployment, participate successfully in regular school-
work, qualify for other training pro«rams suitable 
to his needs, or satisfy Armed FOrces requirements ••• 
(11, p. 42213). 
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Thus, to an extent, the ideology of redistribution and ob-
jectives of representatives of the disadvantaged, public 
school officials and vocational educators, were realized. 
The rest of the Act did not assure preferential treat-
ment for the disadvantaged. Outside Titles III and IV, the 
Act contained few provisions of a kind appropriate to redis-
tribution or an amelioration of structural poverty. The most 
significant of such provisions includeda the vague admoni-
tion to serve disadvantaged and low-income clients •to the 
maximum extent feasible," the equally vague requirement to 
take "into account" the necessity "for continued funding of 
programs of demonstrated effectiveness," the disbursement of 
12.5% of.Title I grant funds according to "the relative num-
ber of adults in families with an annual income below the 
low-income level" in an area, and the required •participa-
tion" by CBOs in planning (11, p. 42207). Considering that 
Titles III and IV got the short end of the stick, in terms 
of the allocation of appropriations, the essentially distrib-
utive character of the Act is apparent. 
A final important characteristic of CETA, as enacted, 
was its compromise nature. This was basically due to the 
context in which it arose. The heterogeneous composition of 
the employment and training system, as passed down from the 
1960s, virtually prohibited anything but a compromise ver-
sion of reform. With organizations as dissimilar as the 
National Alliance of Business and Jobs for Progress, Inc., 
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comprising that system, change would have to be moderate if 
systemic chaos were to be avoided. Pre-CETA reform attempts 
constituted a second set of contextual factors which led to-
ward compromise. The one-sidedness of early legislative pro-
posals, as well as of DOL's executive action, made these re-
form attempts vulnerable to criticism and thus prone to 
failure. The executive action could also be viewed as part 
of the political climate, in which serious antagonisms exist-
ed between the Administration and many groups, and in which 
defenders of categoricals perceived a threat to their in-
terests. That climate pushed reform in the direction of com-
promise, both by increasing the general level of legislative 
activity by groups with a variety of objectives and by stim-
ulating def enders of cate~oricals to fight for an attenuation 
of the more radical tendencies of the reform movement. Last-
ly, the economic situation increased the pressure on every-
one to quit wasting time, get a bill passed, and see to it 
that interests were protected in circumstances of ever-
greater financial undertainty. 
It would not be too far from the truth to say that 
CETA was a package with something for everybody, though more 
for some than others. A look at the extent to which differ-
ent objectives were realized in CETA will illustrate this. 
CETA went a long way toward accomplishing the objec-
tives of the Nixon Administration, though it contained major 
provisions which the Administration tried to prevent. With 
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its transfer of power from federal to subnational govern-
ments, its initiation of •broad-purpose• (41, p. 93), formu-
la-funded grants and its rejection of matching requirements, 
the Act formalized much of the SRS model. Yet, the provi-
sions mandating DOL target programs and residual powers to 
be held by the Secretary of Labor were not in accord with SRS. 
Also, the authorization of public employment took place in 
spite of Administration pressure to block it. 
State governments' objectives were not attained as 
fully as those of their local counterparts. While the states 
formed part of the coalition of forces which successfully re-
alized basic revenue sharing objectives, they failed to be 
designated as central coordinators of programs. By placing 
local governments on an equal footing with states, the Act 
denied to the latter the authority they desired. States did. 
become more entrenched in the employment and training system 
with CETA, through provisions for Governors toa act as prime 
sponsors, have a voice in disbursing funds earmarked for spe-
cial activities (e.g., vocational education, or •state ser-
vices"), and approve the establishment of Job Corps centers. 
In addition, CETA provided for participation of state agen-
cies in the delivery system (11, pp. 42206-42219). However, 
the effective limits on Gubernatorial authority, the M~alance­
of-state" (1, p. 14) jurisdictional arrangement, and the pro-
visions enabling the growth of local government consortia 
(11, p. 42206), all indicated that states did not obtain the 
clear-cut control over funding and planning which they 
sought. 
1)8 
It was general local governments who were the big win-
ners. Cities and counties attained the "bottoms-up# system 
of program development and operation which Canton's mayor 
Cmich wanted (JJ, pp. 76-77). They also won extension of 
public employment, the consortium and special circumstances 
prime sponsorship provisions (11, pp. 42206-42211), and hold-
harmless. With respect to the latter, the allocation of half 
the basic grant money "on the basis of the manpower allotment" 
to an area for the prior fiscal year, plus the command that 
the Secretary's Title I discretionary fund go (as a first 
priority) for maintenance of 90~ of an area's previous amount 
(11, p. 42207), while not meeting city/county demands head-
on, were nevertheless provisions for gradualizing the trans-
ition into CETA. This could all be done with a direct line 
of funding from the federal level. Though both mayors and 
county executives had reason to smile with CETA's passage, 
the latter could claim an even greater victory than their 
city hall counterparts. This was because of the opening up 
of benefits to new non-urban areas and the defeat of the 
mayor's demand for a 150,000 population minimum for county 
sponsorship (a county minimum of 100,000 was enacted) (30, 
p. 58). 
Public schools were not well rewarded in the legisla-
tion. Their anxieties over entrusting control to general 
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governments, over the fate of key categorical programs and 
over the presumptive provider status of established educa-
tional agencies, proved to be based upon an accurate ap-
praisal of the near future. Their demand for school boards 
to be recognized as separate government agencies for employ-
ment and training were not met, and neither was their demand 
for guaranteed pass-through of funds from general govern-
ments to local educational bodies. However, the outcome of 
reform proceedings was not entirely negative from this per-
spective. Through public employment and federal target pro-
grams, school officials could still hope to participate in 
implementation under CETA. Some provisions, for example, 
one prioritizing utilization of MDTA skills centers (11, p. 
42207), or the Title III authorization of programs for cli-
ents limited in the English language (11, p. 42211), hinted 
at continued involvement by schools. Nevertheless, the en-
actment of the general government prime sponsorship system, 
with its implications of fostering new administrative net-
works, was a legislative defeat for many public school offi-
cials. 
Representatives of the disadvantaged also suffered a 
defeat. CETA did not even approximate the federally-insured 
categorical approach demanded by organizations affiliated 
with ethnic minorities and the poverty community. Even Title 
III represented a diluted version of the approach these 
groups desired. While specifying a few programs (e.g., for 
~ 
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native Americans or for limited English-speaking clients), 
that Title did not specify provider organizations or define 
beneficiaries sufficiently from this perspective (11, pp. 
42211-42213). A few provisions did address these groups' 
objectivesa native tribe "eligible applicant• status for 
public employment (11, p. 42209), CBO •participation in" 
planning under prime sponsorships (11, p. 42207), a CAA role 
in Job Corps client screening (11, p. 42214). Additionally, 
the phrase• 
••• to the maximum extent feasible manpower ser-
vices ••• will be provided to those most in need of 
them, including low-income persons and persons of 
limited English-speaking ability, and that the need 
for continued funding of programs of demonstrated 
effectiveness is taken into account ••• (11, p. 42207), 
represented a kind of admonition intended for prime sponsors 
in developing plans. Yet, the vagueness of such a phrase 
epitomized the main problem with the Act from the standpoint 
of the disadvantaged, and the few references which focused 
on the objectives of this sector looked like token gestures 
compared to what had come out of Congress in the 1960s. 
Organized labor was also unsuccessful, in light of its 
position favoring centralization/categorization, though CETA 
did reflect labor's opinion in other ways. The AFL-CIO de-
mand for "overall Federal control of policy, direction and 
standards• (JJ, p. 489) was not even remotely approached. 
Also, labor's wish for a definite role in the service and 
job delivery processes went unheeded. Yet, the compromise 
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nature of the bill was apparent in that two important union 
proposals were enacted. The most prominent of these was pub-
lic employment with favorable appropriation authorizations 
and none of the killing restrictions which some groups wanted. 
Labor also saw its position reflected in the incorporation 
of desired formula factors (i.e., numbers of unemployed and 
adults in low-income families) (ll, pp. 42207, 42209). 
Business organizations, like state governments, were 
a valuable part of the coalition which fought for basic re-
form but also failed to obtain the kind of bill that was pre-
ferred. Public employment was the major setback. The open-
ended provision enacted was not reflective of business opin-
ion. Beside this, CETA contained very little in the way of 
promises of business participation in the system. While 
profit-making enterprises would probably end up with a role 
to play, the evasive language of the Act left that role 
mostly undefined. 
The two stalwarts in the systems vocational schools and 
the Training and Employment Service, received a rebuff in 
CETA's failure to denote presumed service providers. The Act 
opened the door to possible constructions of bureaucracies 
which could be alternatives to these old-line entities. Their 
objectives with respect to the governmental form of the CETA 
arrangement were also ignored1 vocational schools did not 
obtain equal status with local governments, and the Service's 
state emphasis remained unrealized. These bastions of -~a.n-
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power" and training had to be content with lesser prizes 
scattered throughout the Act. Vocational schools were award-
ed 5• of Title I appropriations (11, p. 42209). The Act 
clearly intended that MDTA skills centers be utilized •to 
the extent feasible" for institutional training (11, p. 
42207). In addition, Title III federal activities included 
some in which vocational schools were e.xperienced1 something 
which might enhance the perceived usefulness of the schools 
(11, pp. 42211-4221)). The Training and Employment Service 
was assigned duties such as inf"ormation processing, benefit 
disbursement and, to a limited extent, job-placement (11, 
pp. 42206-42219). There was also a paragraph requiring state 
sponsors to "provide for the coordination of programs fi-
nanced under the Wagner-Peyser Act" (11, p. 42208), that is, 
the law establishing the Service in 1933 (4, p. 11). Beyond 
that, the Service was left in limbo, its exact role to be 
determined by the assessments of political officeholders (at 
all three levels of government). 
In its incorporation of such a plurality of interests, 
CETA was a typical product of the American political system. 
Between 1969, when the first major legislative reform pro-
posals were made, and the bargain struck in 1973, there oc-
curred over four years of efforts to find a compromise. The 
end result reflected the input of a broad spectrum of forces 
(both ideological and socio-political), as those forces com-
bined within a historical context. The policy-making machin-
14) 
ery in Washington was activated by interest groups with suf-
ficient access to it, and tilted by the weight of the times. 
However, CETA was also atypical in that it instituted 
policy changes based on concepts (decentralization, decate-
gorization, consolidation, comprehensiveness) with which con-
tinuation of existing grantsmanship games was incompatible. 
The significance of CETA would be seen both in terms of fed-
eral assistance generally and employment and training in 
particular. It was one of the first Acts of Congress aimed 
at reigning in the federal octopus which had become so over-
bearing in recent decades. It was the first Act of Congress 
aimed at harmonizing the many components of the national 
employment and training effort in a comprehensive fashion. 
No matter what the future holds, the CETA reform debate will 
stand as an episode in which the basic relationships between 
the United States government and its public and private con-
stituents were called into question, and in an area of policy 
which seems to become more critical as time passes. 
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